CHAPTER 5
The Design Plan and NonBasic Theistic
Belief
The concession to partial basicality in chapter 4 is the starting-point for
understanding how a full-blown acceptance of warrant by reasons may be integrated with
Plantinga’s epistemology without sacrificing or compromising either the soft or hard
theses. In this chapter I will develop a plausible view of warranted nonbasic theistic
belief based on Plantinga's theory of warrant and proper function.[1] More specifically, I will be developing such an
account by analyzing the ways in which the sensus
divinitatis (as an immediate source of theistic belief) may be thought to malfunction.
The cognitive malfunctions I will be considering may be viewed as an account of (at least
some of) the noetic effects of sin given Plantinga’s theory of warrant and proper
function. My overall case will support the contention that there are two closely related
circumstances that increase the importance of natural theology. First, cognitive
malfunction (specifically malfunctions of the sensus
divinitatis) increases the importance modes of theistic belief formation besides the
immediate mode related to the sensus divinitatis
and experiential grounds. Secondly, the acquisition of defeaters against theistic belief
creates a need for additional resources to sustain the rationality of theistic belief. In
both these cases, natural theology has an important epistemic role.
I. The Design Plan and Theistic Belief
A. Aspects of the Design Plan
Central to Plantinga’s discussion of warranted belief is the notion of a cognitive design plan - a set of blueprints or
specifications for a well-formed, properly functioning human cognitive system (1993b, pp.
13-14, 21). The design plan may be unpacked in terms of triples of the form:
<circumstance, response, and purpose or function>. The design plan specifies, not
merely what our cognitive response will be in certain circumstances, but what the appropriate response of our cognitive faculties
should be in those circumstances (appropriate given its purpose). For instance, in the
circumstance of being appeared to redly, the appropriate response ceteris paribus is that the belief that there is a
red object in front of one is formed. But the circumstances need not be restricted to
experience in the sense of being appeared to as such and such, what we might call sensuous experience. It could just as well be the
kind of nonsensuous phenomenology which
accompanies (or leads to) the formation of a priori
and memory beliefs. Equally though, the circumstances could be (or include) beliefs or the
considering of propositions. Upon considering the propositions (A) all men are mortal and
(B) Socrates is a man, I form the belief (C) Socrates is mortal. In short, we can think of
our cognitive establishment as responsive to beliefs and experience(s) (in the sense of a
broad range of nonpropositional circumstances). Also, the design plan specifies for the
relevant sorts of circumstances the appropriate degree or firmness of a belief formed (or
modified) in response to those circumstances.
Moreover, since the design plan may state how a thing will change over time, it is important to distinguish the here-and-now design plan from the design plan at other times, where relevant changes have been introduced. We may capture the idea of a thing’s working at a given time by speaking of a snapshot design plan (1993b, p. 22). A master design plan will be the succession of snapshot design plans appropriate for a thing given its entire history.[2] The proper functioning of one’s cognitive equipment at age 3 is different from its proper functioning at age 34. In this sense a human person’s cognitive situation consists of different snapshot design plans as they grow. This will be true not only as a result of mental maturation with age development but the process of learning or education can play a hand in understanding how the design plan may be modified over time. “More precisely,” says Plantinga, “the design plan specifies how learning new facts and new skills will lead to changes in cognitive reaction” (1993b, p. 43). So, for instance, a person who spends several years in college or graduate school studying history, biology, or philosophy acquires over that time a new snapshot design plan (or at least one such plan). The master design plan will state which snapshot design plans are appropriate for a person at what age and in what circumstances.[3]
The succession of snapshot design plans is closely related to another matter, and
that is the acquisition of defeaters in one’s noetic structure, reasons to believe a
proposition’s denial (rebutters) and reasons not to believe a proposition
(undercutters).[4] The design plan specifies that when we are appeared to
rainly, we form the belief <it is raining>. But it will also specify the conditions
under which, though one is appeared to rainly,
one does not form the belief it is raining outside. A person may acquire evidence that,
say, the neighbor is spraying water from a garden hose over the fence (undercutter) or
that there are no clouds in the sky (rebutter). If the person did not have these
defeaters, then he would (by virtue of being appeared to a certain way) be warranted in
believing that it is raining outside. Equally it may be a matter of providing a person
with reasons for not believing some proposition to the degree which he believed it before
the acquisition of the relevant defeater. Now a complicated defeater system is acquired
not only with age but social exposure and education. So a master design plan will have a
series of sub-plans, that is to say, specifications for what sort of beliefs we will not
form given other things we now know (or are experiencing). Simplifying matters, since a
person’s belief has warrant only if her cognitive system is functioning properly,
warrant will require the proper functioning of a person’s defeater system. This
entails that if S believes that she has a rebutting or undercutting defeater for B,
rationality requires a modification of her noetic structure with respect to B. If the
defeater is partial, rationality requires S’s holding B less firmly than before the
acquisition of the defeater. If the defeater is full, rationality calls for the deletion
of B from S’s noetic structure. S might, of course, have a defeater-defeater against
an initial defeater. In this case, S might remain rational in holding in B (to the degree
she does) after the acquisition of a defeater. What constitutes irrationality is S’s
holding B (or holding B firmly) and holding that she has an undefeated defeater for B
(which requires either not holding B or holding B less firmly than she does).
To say that warrant depends on one’s cognitive faculties functioning properly
does not imply that warrant depends on all of one’s cognitive faculties functioning
properly (1993b, p. 10). A defective memory need not stand in the way of warranted sensory
perceptual beliefs. What is required is that the modules responsible for the particular
belief in question be properly functioning. Even here, though, certain allowances must be
made. A given module need not be functioning properly over its entire range of operation.
The module responsible for the formation of sensory perceptual beliefs may be damaged so
that objects beyond 30 feet are blurry, but objects closer than 30 feet are not blurry.
Moreover, even objects at 30 feet may be distinguished by colour, if not shape. And if a
person is colour blind, beliefs about the shapes of certain objects can possess warrant.
Frequently, external aids may be introduced to rectify the situation. My visual defects
are corrected by a pair of glasses, thereby allowing the sensory perceptual module to
furnish me with warranted beliefs about objects which otherwise I would not be warranted
in holding. So one’s cognitive faculty need not be functioning perfectly to produce
warranted beliefs. Cognitive proper function/malfunction comes in degrees.
B. The Sensus Divinitatis
Plantinga (1993b, p. 48) lists several important modules of the human cognitive
establishment: self-knowledge, memory, sensory perception, testimony, a priori knowledge, induction and probability, and
more controversially, modules for the formation of moral and religious beliefs. With
respect to the last of these, Plantinga notes what Calvin calls the sensus divinitatis and the testimony of the Holy
Spirit. Plantinga takes these as immediate sources for religious belief (1990b, p. 56). Although I shall eventually argue that the design
plan is not restricted to these latter two modules in the formation and/or sustenance of
theistic (or more broadly religious) belief, here I direct my attention to the module
which has received the most coverage by Plantinga himself to date. Calvin speaks of the sensus divinitatis (Institutes I.iii.1) and Plantinga has interpreted
this as a cognitive module responsible for the immediate
formation of various theistic beliefs. Recalling the exposition of chapter 3, Plantinga
takes it that the sensus divinitatis module
(hereafter the SD-module) is triggered by widely realized experiential conditions. These
include “beholding the majesty of the mountains, or the glory of the starry heavens
above, or the power of the ocean, or the marvelous, highly articulate beauty of a tiny
flower” (1991, p. 304). The result is the formation of any one of a number of
theistic propositions: God has created all this, God is present, God is guiding me, God is
sustaining the world, and so on. Translating this into design plan terminology, we should
say that human beings have been designed in such a way that in these circumstances the
appropriate response from their cognitive system (specifically the SD-module) is that they
are strongly inclined to believe theistic propositions of the form just given. Furthermore, we should say that they are typically
going to believe such propositions rather firmly (firm enough for the degree of warrant to
be sufficient to transform true belief into knowledge), perhaps equal to the degree to
which they believe in the existence of other minds and the external world.
[D1]
In a range of widely realized experiential circumstances C1, . . . ,Cn,
human beings have a strong inclination to form (or maintain) beliefs that Pt1,
. . . ,Ptn to some fairly high degree.
To be more precise, what we really have are circumstance-response pairs like:
(1)
C<the sight of a starry night sky>
R<firm belief that God created
this>
(2)
C<sight and sound of the ocean>
R<firm belief that God is
powerful>
(3)
C<the sound of a lovely piece of music>
R<firm belief that God is
present>
(4)
C<belief that one has done some wrong action>
R<firm belief that God disapproves
of what one has done>
(5)
C<confessing one’s wrong doing>
R<firm belief that God has forgiven
one>
(6)
C<engaging in the activity of prayer>
R<firm belief that God hears one>
I will be taking “response” in the above pairs to mean response in accordance with the design plan. For ease of
exposition I will simply speak of <circumstance-response> pairs as opposed to
triples of <circumstance-response-purpose>. Also, the appropriate response need not
be restricted to one particular belief-type. It may be that for some set of circumstances
there is more than one appropriate response for each member of the circumstance set. To
keep matters simple, the paradigm circumstance-response pairs will have one specific
belief as the doxastic response. Moreover, I will take it that the sorts of
circumstance-response pairs given above are going to be the snapshot design plan for a
mature adult. The master design plan is going to include other snapshot design plans which
vary to a greater or lesser extent from what I have sketched. One variation will be found
in contrasting the snapshot design plan of an adult with that of a child, for the process
of mental development and maturation with age is going to require a different snapshot
design plan. These variations I think might be found at two points, the sorts of
conditions which are intended to trigger theistic beliefs and the sorts of theistic
beliefs which are in fact triggered. It may be that for young children the design plan
dictates less sophisticated sorts of religious beliefs in these conditions (indeed this
would seem to be a requirement dependent on a person’s conceptual development),
perhaps beginning with some rather vague sense of a god of some sort. And it may be that
some of the stipulated conditions only activate the disposition to form theistic beliefs
for adults, such as listening to a beautiful piece of music, whereas others trigger
theistic beliefs in the young as well as adults, say, the experience of a thunder and
lightening storm. And it may be that for young children there are conditions that yield
theistic belief more readily than for adults, say, testimony from one’s parents
(though this would not be the SD-module but that known as testimony).
Later in this chapter and more thoroughly in chapter 8 I will argue that theistic
beliefs based on experiential grounds depend for their sophistication on a background
system of beliefs (and so social input and education play a role), and here testimony may
indeed be a significant determining factor. This account stands temporarily incomplete by
restricting attention to the SD-module, but as I will shortly argue there are other
modules responsible for theistic belief. These include testimony and inferential
reasoning. The design plan may very well specify testimony as the primary mode of theistic
belief formation in children. And that what they learn on testimony would certainly
contribute (along with beliefs produced by inferential reasoning) to a background system
of belief that, as they grow, allows for a variety of beliefs to be generated and
sustained by experiential grounds (with increasing degrees of sophistication).
For the moment I only want to restate [D1]
so as to allow for appropriate variation within the design plan.
[D2]
In a range of widely realized experiential circumstances C1, . . . ,Cn
specified by the appropriate snapshot design plan, human beings have a strong inclination
to form (or maintain) beliefs that Pt1, . . . ,Ptn to some fairly
high degree, where the range of C1, . . . ,Cn and Pt1, .
. . ,Ptn is a function of the appropriate snapshot design plan.
II. Sensus
Divinitatis Cognitive Malfunctions
But how might the Christian theological concept of the noetic effects of sin
(strongly emphasized in Reformed theology) bear on Plantinga’s account design plan
and the warrant of theistic belief? I think this is a most pertinent question, especially
since a good deal of the negative press that natural theology has received within the
Reformed tradition has been based on the so-called noetic effects of sin. By “the
noetic effects of sin” I understand a broad range of negative influences and
consequences the presence of sin in the human psyche has for man's cognitive system.[5] These include: the believing of falsehoods (or
the mere disposition to do so), various mistakes in observation, memory, and thought
processes, diminished capacity to assess rightly and see the force of certain kinds of
evidence, and general lack of clarity in the understanding. The precise nature of the
interaction between these noetic defects and the corruption of the human will, affection,
or passions, I leave out of the picture.[6] In
the present case I am interested particularly in how the noetic effects of sin might
affect the warrant of various theistic beliefs (though beliefs formed on the basis of pride, arrogance, etc. could be cases of cognitive
malfunction). This requires answering at least two questions. First, what does the
original design plan dictate regarding the formation (and sustenance) of theistic belief?
That is, what modules are responsible for the production (and sustenance) of theistic
beliefs? And how might these modules have been affected by sin? How might the sensus divinitatis experience malfunction as the
result of sin?
Plantinga writes (1991, p. 308):
It is only because of the results of
sin, only because of this unnatural fallen condition, Calvin thinks, that some of us find
belief in God difficult or absurd. If it weren’t for sin and its effects, we human
beings would believe in God with same sort of natural spontaneity and to the same degree
that we believe in the existence of ourselves, other persons, and the past. This is the
natural human condition, the condition of a person all of whose cognitive faculties are
functioning properly.
Plantinga here just scratches the surface of what I want to develop in detail, an
account of the noetic effects of sin on a person’s noetic structure and the proper
functioning of their theistic module(s), what I will call hamartic cognitive malfunction. Since the design
plan involves a set of circumstance-response pairs the rather obvious way to spell out the
noetic effects of sin is by explicating a range of malfunctions in the
circumstance-response pairs.
A. Cognitive Flatlining and Misfires
The most severe cognitive malfunction of the SD-module would be the failure to form any belief that Pt in any of the widely realized circumstances. Here we have the circumstance but no response from the cognitive module - what we can call doxastic flat lining. This could be a phenomenon relative to one, some, or all of a person’s snapshot design plans. Perhaps as a young child the SD-module was functioning according the specifications of the snapshot design plan then relevant. Later in life, though, the conditions specified for a new snapshot design plan (that of a mature adult) do not trigger theistic beliefs of any sort. If the SD-module were the only theistic module of the human cognitive establishment, then SD-module flat lining would lead to agnosticism. I do not want to make that claim, though, as I shall shortly argue for a multiplicity of theistic relevant modules. In that case SD-module cognitive flat lining would be compatible with theistic belief being generated or sustained by another module of the human noetic establishment.[7] Nevertheless agnosticism does appear to entail the phenomenon I am describing, for agnostics would be people in whom the SD-module is totally nonfunctional for some period time. The phenomenon of atheism is a little more difficult to assess, for here it is not merely the failure to form (any) theistic belief but the actual formation of the belief that God does not exist. The distinction between failing to form the appropriate belief and forming an inappropriate belief is the distinction between doxastic flat lining and doxastic misfires (the former can obviously lead to the latter). It is also conceivable that belief that God does not exist is the result of malfunction in some other cognitive module, but that the SD-module is functioning properly over at least some range of its operation. Noetic structures could exemplify something like cognitive blockage.[8]
[M1]
For some or all of a person S’s snapshot design plans, there is no belief that
Pt formed (or sustained) in any of the widely realized circumstances specified by that
snapshot design plan.
Another malfunction is that only sometimes do we find the appropriate response to
the circumstances specified by a particular snapshot design plan. At one time t1,
we have the pair [C<the sight of a starry night sky> & R<firm belief that God
is created this>], and at some other time t2 we have malfunction such that
[C<the sight of a starry night sky> & R<----------------->. Call this
condition temporary cognitive (or doxastic) response flat lining.[9] The SD-module, at some time(s) responsive to some
circumstance(s), is not at another time.[10] This is a
kind of frequency problem in a person's cognitive responses, which itself comes in
degrees. Maybe the doxastic flat lining phenomenon is rare; maybe it is frequent. Perhaps
it is only present in the presence of other conditions which interfere with the proper
function of the SD-module (a matter to which I will return). Point being that this sort of
malfunction comes in degrees. Moreover, it may be true for either the formation or
maintenance of a belief. A similar malfunction would be doxastic flat lining with
reference to some circumstance-response pairs but not others. Here there is the same sort
of stipulations as with the former phenomenon.
[M2]
For some or all snapshot design plans, there is some circumstance Cn
such that at time t1 S forms (or maintains) some belief that Ptn (as
the appropriate response specified by the snapshot design plan), but at time t2
S does not form (or hold) the belief that Ptn in circumstance Cn.
But flat lining may not only be a frequency problem vis-à-vis the
circumstance-response pair, but it may relate to the range of such pairs. A malfunctioning
phenomenon may arise when a person’s cognitive module responds to some but not all of
the circumstances specified for belief formation and/or sustenance by a particular
snapshot design plan. Whereas in [M2] S has a
response/no response to the same circumstance over different times, this is a matter of
responding to only some circumstances. This suggests that a mechanism is not functioning
properly over its whole range of operation. An analogy here may be taken from the hearing
mechanism that hears only some notes it was designed to hear, or the eye that cannot see
certain colours. Suppose the snapshot design plan dictates that when S’s SD-module is
functioning properly we will find a set of circumstance-response pairs, which include
(3)
C<the sound of a lovely piece of music>
R<firm belief that God is
present>
(4)
C<belief that one has done some wrong action>
R<firm belief that God disapproves
of what one has done>
(5)
C<confessing one’s wrong doing>
R<firm belief that God has forgiven
one>
Suppose though that we get (3) and (4),
but not (5) - thereby leading to a troubled conscience. Examples could be multiplied. The
central point is that where the design plan stipulates some set of circumstance-response
pairs {CR1, CR2, CR3, . . . ,CRn}, the
malfunction in question may be stated as the set {CR1, CR2, CR3,
. . . ,CRn} minus at least one of its elements CRi. Again, this sort
of defect may appear during some or all of a person's snapshot design plans. So we can
state a general third type of malfunction as:
[M3]
For some or all snapshot design plans, S fails to form (or hold) some belief that
Ptn in some circumstance Cn, where the circumstance-response pair
<Cn,Ptn> is a member of the circumstance-response pair set
dictated by the snapshot design plan.
But the range of operation may be adversely affected in other ways. Here a close
analogy would be something like the nearsighted person who can spot brown objects along
the side of the road at a distance of 30 yards but who believes that they are garbage cans
when in fact they are cows. So another sort of cognitive malfunction is evidenced when on
some occasions there is a belief response but it is not the appropriate sort of response
in some sense. This is the doxastic misfire phenomenon introduced above. How one unpacks
this will depend considerably on how we spell out the design plan, but a few examples will
suffice. Instead of the circumstance-response pair [C<the sight of a starry night
sky>, R<firm belief that God is created this>] we get [C<the sight of the
starry night sky>, R<there is no God>] or [C<the sight of the starry night
sky>, R<the universe is the product of blind chance>]. Calvin makes much of the
denial of God's providential care and control over the world (I.iv.2; I.v.11) and
attributing to nature what should be attributed to God (I.v.4). So we need not think of
misfires as being confined to denials of the existence of God (or beliefs which entail
that God does not exist) but, at least for Calvin, they involve the more subtle corruption
of the “pure and clear knowledge of God” (I.v.14). This corruption may be
outright falsehoods in the religious sphere or truths which are vague or unclear (much
like the inability of some people to see at a distance or up-close). Here again, we may
assert degrees of malfunction.
[M4]
For some or all snapshot design plans, S forms (or holds) a belief that p (or Pt)
in some circumstance C, but S fails to form (or hold) the appropriate belief that Pt in C
as dictated by the snapshot design plan.
B. Degree of Belief and Defeater
System Malfunctions
There may also be strength of conviction failures. In [D2] I noted that the design plan specifies the
degree of the strength of belief for circumstance-response pairs. Malfunction may be
something like [C<sight of the starry night sky> & R<less than firm belief
that God is present>]. Calvin emphasizes how the effects of sin on the human
personality obscure the objective clarity of God’s existence.[11] This malfunction, like the others, may be
exhibited at various times in a person’s life, and this may range over some or all
snapshot design plans as a person’s cognitive life develops. Strength of belief
malfunctions are those instances where the design plans calls for a doxastic response of a
certain degree given the particular circumstances and yet the response lacks the
appropriate oomph! Plantinga speaks several times about how if there were no sin, we would
up and form theistic belief with a greater natural spontaneity than we in fact do.
[M5]
For some or all snapshot design plans, S forms (or holds) the appropriate belief
that Pt in circumstance C but S’s belief that Pt is less than firm in C, and where
the snapshot design plan dictates that S firmly believe Pt in C.
There are, however, some crucial qualifications required here. Decreased strength
of belief, or failure to form (or hold) a belief, in some circumstances may actually be
part of the design plan and so constitute proper function. This follows from the
no-defeater requirement as a component of proper function. If defeater D is a partial
defeater for S’s belief that p at t1, then if S is rational in holding p,
S believes p less firmly at t1 than S did at tn-1. If D is a
complete defeater, rationality requires the deletion of the belief p from S’s noetic
structure. Now if there is a defeater-system along these lines, malfunction in a defeater
system would be something like S’s continuing to believe p with the same degree of
firmness after the acquisition of a defeater as S did before the defeater acquisition.
This seems to be something like doxastic tenacity. But
in the case where S has an intrinsic defeater-defeater against some putative defeater,
doxastic tenacity is entirely appropriate. In fact, as long as S has a defeater-defeater
(of the appropriate sort), doxastic tenacity is not a cognitive dysfunction. The defect in
view is better described as doxastic stubbornness:
S’s continuing to hold B (with the degree of firmness that he does) given the
conjunction of a defeating condition and the absence of any defeater-defeater.
If the defeater system is built into the design plan as just considered, I see no
reason why it wouldn’t hold for theistic belief in particular. Surely, if a defeater
system operates the way Plantinga suggests, it will operate this way for theistic belief
too. It is simply one of the consequences of a person’s having a cognitive design
plan that includes a defeater system that this system will have consequences for the
epistemic status of theistic belief in certain situations. So the design plan will, as I
see it, dictate that S form a firm belief that Pt in some circumstance C unless there is some undefeated defeater for
S’s belief that Pt in C. So the belief
<God created all this> may be the appropriate doxastic response to the simple
circumstance C <sight of the starry night sky>, but not if the circumstance is
complex C* and includes strong reasons for believing that God does not exist (or for
believing that C is not a warrant conferring circumstance for belief in God). To be sure,
the circumstance would also have to exclude S’s theistic belief having more by way of
warrant than the defeater, but this is just to say that the circumstance must exclude
defeater-defeaters (intrinsic or extrinsic). But it does appear that defeater system
malfunction yields the following result:
[M6]
For some or all snapshot design plans, S forms (or holds) the firm belief that Pt
in some complex circumstance C*, where C* includes a (rebutting or undercutting) defeater
to theistic belief, but the snapshot design plan dictates that, unless C* includes
defeater-defeaters, S should not form (or hold) the belief that Pt or not form (or hold)
it with the degree of strength that S does.
It might be thought that [M6]
constitutes cognitive malfunction only if the defeater D in S’s noetic structure N
has much by way of warrant by virtue of being based on arguments which have a good deal of
force given correct inductive standards. So, take the rebutting defeater [it is probable
that <God does not exist>] given contingent evidence e, where e = an evidential
argument from the existence of moral evil. Plantinga has claimed (1986e, p. 309) that such
a defeater does not have much by way of warrant since no one has constructed a cogent
atheological probabilistic argument from evil. Perhaps, then, we are not rational to believe a theistic proposition
less firmly just because of such an apparent defeater. In other terms, it might be thought
that the design plan specifies that we believe a theistic proposition less firmly (or not
at all) only if a doxastic defeater against it is (at least) more probable than not on the
evidence adduced given correct inductive
standards.
This doesn’t seem right though, and for several reasons. First, in
Plantinga’s view there are considerations in support of the notion that a belief can
be defeater even if it has little by way of warrant.[12]
Secondly, even given correct inductive standards, the epistemic probability value
of h on e will still vary depending on both the evidence e and the logical capacities and
knowledge of the subject. There is no obvious reason for thinking that no one will have a
total evidence base such that it makes the negation of theism more probable than not.
Thirdly, suppose the evidential probability of h on e is relative to S’s own
inductive standards. What’s wrong with that? Why should that not be in the ballpark
for what is sufficient for constituting a legitimate defeater for theistic belief? It
certainly affects the degree of belief, and on that account affects the degree of warrant.
But why should the design plan not take subjective evidential probability values as having
defeater relevance? Suppose further that it is not sufficient that <God does not
exist> is rendered more probable than not given S’s own inductive standards.
Surely we can add something like “and S has checked (sufficiently by S’s own
standards) to see that he has good reason to believe that his inductive standards measure
up to correct standards.” Fourthly, worst case scenario. S’s inductive standards
contain false logical beliefs and S’s noetic structure contains several irrational
noetic sectors. These false beliefs and irrational sectors may well have consequences for
what it is rational for S to believe (especially where these sectors contain logical
beliefs, such as what is evidence for what). It may be that a defeater generated by false
inductive standards is sufficient to call for revision in one’s noetic structure.
Plantinga has made the very interesting observation that a belief may be rational even if
the noetic structure to which it belongs is not rational. More specifically, given some
irrational belief and circumstance, the rational thing is to hold p (where if one
didn’t hold the irrational belief the rational thing might be not to hold p, or even
to hold not-p). “Given that I have to come to believe (perhaps irrationally) that
this dog is trying to drive me insane, the rational thing to do is to give up my previous
view that dogs never intentionally set out to drive people insane” (1994a, pp.
22-23). Similarly it seems that if S’s own inductive standards (false or irrational
as they are) make some proposition p more probable than not, then - all other things being
equal - the rational thing is to believe p. What else could S be expected to do? It is
hard to see how we could have knowledge unless we followed our own inductive standards and
thus on occasion reasoned in accord with false inductive standards. The person for whom
the nonexistence of God is in fact more probable than not given his (incorrect) inductive
standards will it seems, ceteris paribus, be
rational in withholding theistic belief, especially if he has considered the matter and
found no reason to doubt his inductive standards and has no evidence to the contrary.
III. NonBasic Theistic Belief and
Proper Function
Having established some of the forms of cognitive malfunction with respect to the
SD-module, the proper role of reasons may now be explicated.
A. Theistic Relevant Cognitive Modules
In the last chapter I developed a case for partial immediate/mediate beliefs,
beliefs based on reasons and experiential grounds (where each contributed partial
sustaining or evidential support, or both). The reason for this, citing Plantinga, was
that doubts may enter into a person's noetic structure so that they do not hold the belief
with the degree of firmness required for warrant (or the degree of warrant sufficient,
with true belief, for knowledge). Basic beliefs are compatible with degrees of doubt, and
reasons may assuage those doubts considerably, and may also contribute to the evidential
support of beliefs (in fact may do the former by doing the latter). What this tells us is
that the sensus divinitatis, even if an
immediate mode of belief production and sustenance, is not the only module responsible for
or relevant to the formation and sustenance of theistic beliefs. Plantinga of course
stresses the immediate mode, but in fact by admitting that reasons may increase the degree
of warrant, there must be a place for additional theistic relevant modules in the
cognitive system (or a broader sense of the SD-module).
There are two moves open to Plantinga. One is to say that the design plan specifies
that in sin unaffected conditions, the proper
functioning cognitive system will form belief in God in an immediate fashion and only in
such a fashion, but that matters are different in a sin affected environment. There is
what we might call a pre-lapsarian snapshot design
plan and a post-lapsarian snapshot design plan.
The human cognitive system acquires a new design plan as a result of being damaged by sin.
Up to this point I have been referring to snapshot design plans independent of this sort
of distinction, but I think it can easily be integrated into the picture. We can simply
think of the pre- and post-lapsarian design plans as containing further sub-plans which
range over the sorts of considerations introduced earlier (e.g., mental maturation and
educational exposure). So the master design plan will recognize reasons contributing to
warrant for the post-lapsarian snapshot design plan (and all its sub-plans), but not
before then. Alternatively, the master design plan may specify that for both pre-lapsarian
and post-lapsarian man, reasons may make a contribution to the warrant of theistic belief,
or may be a sufficient ground for warranted beliefs about God. Plantinga himself admits
(1991) that reason may contribute to the warrant of theistic belief. This implies that
reasons are at least worked into the post-lapsarian design plan, for reasons could not
increase the degree of warrant for theistic belief under circumstances of doubt or
wavering belief if believing at least in part on the basis of propositional evidence did
not constitute proper function. Although I think this should be extended to the
pre-lapsarian design plan, I will proceed on the more modest position that propositional
evidence plays the role it does in conferring warrant given a post-lapsarian design plan.
The question, then, is what other modules could be responsible for generating or sustaining theistic beliefs? There may indeed be modules that produce immediate theistic beliefs other than the sensus divinitatis, if for instance God exists is a self-evident or a priori truth. (Or perhaps this just indicates a broader function of the sensus divinitatis). Perhaps the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit is relevant here, as Plantinga himself has suggested. Human testimony is certainly another source of knowledge, and one that I indicated earlier is quite active with respect to the acquisition of religious beliefs in children. It is not clear, though, whether testimony should be regarded as an immediate or mediate source of belief.[13] Testimony aside for the moment, it seems that a large part of our cognitive set-up is devoted to believing things on the basis of other things we believe. And theistic belief is no exception to this, however one chooses to cut the design-plan cake. What we learn from our other sources of belief may indeed furnish a noetic structure with the sorts of propositions that can provide (causal and evidential) support for various theistic beliefs. The history of natural theology provides a wealth of such instances. Through sensory perception we gain knowledge of our immediate physical environment, an external world consisting of many sorts of physical objects (of differing sizes, shapes, and volumes) which interact in certain ways. With the assistance of scientific instruments such as microscopes and telescopes we gain knowledge about very small objects (cells and viruses) and very large, distant objects (planets, stars, galaxies). We observe regularities of various sorts that reveal spatial and temporal order. Reasoning from experience we formulate statements about laws which operate within the universe and account for the behavior and interaction of physical objects. Here we have the basic data out of which cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God have been formulated.[14] Sensory experience, testimony, memory, induction, intuition (mathematical, logical, and philosophical), introspection, and extrospection are all (at least potentially) relevant to theistic belief. Basic and nonbasic sources of belief would seem to provide theistic relevant evidences.[15]
B. Reasons and Malfunctions
Given the plethora of cognitive malfunctions canvassed above which can and do
plague humans in the SD-module, it would be important to have recourse within our
cognitive environment to ground theistic belief in other ways, such as suggested above.[16] In the last chapter I noted that reasons may
contribute to the epistemic status of theistic belief, especially where there are doubts.
Depending on the person in question, and the specific ways in which the noetic effects of
sin have been instantiated in them, it may well be that reasons may strengthen the
person’s degree of belief. Perhaps the person has formed a variety of warranted
beliefs about the empirical world, and these beliefs provide some degree of support for
the proposition that God exists. Assuming that the person sees that these beliefs do
support belief in God, they may well add warrant to a theistic belief otherwise held
solely on the basis of experience. There is no guarantee, of course, that each person who
has such evidence will see that they indeed have reasons for believing in God (perhaps sin
has affected their reasoning capacity in that respect). But it is reasonable to assume
that some people at some times in certain situations will see reasons for believing in God
which will strengthen their belief (otherwise) based on experiential conditions.
It seems equally clear, though, that for some people reasons could provide the sole
basis for (at least some) theistic beliefs. The importance of this becomes quite evident
when we scan the sorts of malfunctions explicated above. Some people are simply not able
to form much less sustain theistic beliefs on the basis of the widely realized conditions
we looked at. I take this to be an empirical fact (though I am giving it a
theological/philosophical explanation as malfunction due to sin). If there are a plethora
of sources for theistic belief, there will be prospects for such individuals to have
theistic beliefs that could be based on other sources. Temporary SD doxastic flat lining
may even be overcome by the sustenance of theistic belief on reasons for a time.
Propositional grounds at time t1 which serve to highlight theistic-relevant
features of the created world may lead to stimulating the SD-module so that at some later
time t2 the person forms theistic belief on the immediate basis of those widely
realized experiential conditions. Given the variety of ways in which the flat lining
phenomenon may manifest itself, the availability of reasons may prove essential to the
sustenance of some theistic beliefs over particular periods of time.[17] Moreover, the possibility of deception to varying
degrees was also a clear problem encountered above. As in the case of nontheistic beliefs,
so in the case of theistic beliefs, what can be known from other sources may serve as a
corrective for error in one source.
The argument from defeaters creates a similar need for propositional grounds.
Doubts about the veridical nature of immediate sources of theistic belief, generated by
defeaters, may be legitimate (as in the case of sensory perceptual beliefs). The same is
true when doubts arise because of arguments against the existence of God. Perhaps the
design plan indicates the following sorts of circumstance-response pairs:
(1)
C<sight
of starry-night sky>
R<firm
belief that God created all this>
(7)
C<(i)sight
of starry-night sky & (ii)the problem of evil>
R<less
than firm belief that God created all this>
(8)
C<(i)sight
of starry-night sky, (ii) the problem of evil, & (iii) reason to believe that God
exists>
R<firm
belief that God created all this>
I noted in the last chapter that in some cases, especially where the defeater
(rebutting or undercutting) to theistic belief is weak, an undercutting defeater-defeater
would be sufficient to defeat the initial defeater and restore warrant to theistic belief.
This suggests that in the design plan we would find matters a bit more detailed and
complex, so as to allow for something like:
(9)
C<(i)
sight of starry-night sky, (ii) the problem of evil, (iii) good reason to believe that
(ii) is either invalid or unsound>
R<firm
belief that God created all this>
Whether the appropriate response should be firm
belief in God will depend on how good the
reasons are for believing that the argument from evil does not succeed. And as I have
argued, this will normally be true given S’s own inductive standards. But a very
likely situation is that an undercutting defeater-defeater (as in (9)) is not strong
enough (due to either its own intrinsic weakness or relative to the force of the initial
defeater) to sustain a firm belief in God unless
a rebutting defeater-defeater is brought into the picture. This will be more common I
think in cases where the initial defeater is itself a rebutting defeater (and so a reason
not to believe in God). As suggested above if the rebutting defeater-defeater is itself of
a high degree of force for S, then an undercutting defeater-defeater will not even be
necessary. If the rebutting (or undercutting) defeater is of a high degree of force for S,
an undercutting defeater-defeater may not be sufficient. That would also seem to be
determined by how strong (given S’s own inductive standards) the undercutting
defeater-defeater is. But it is plausible to suppose that, given a particular objection to
theistic belief which carries some fairly high degree of force, undercutting and rebutting
defeater-defeaters together constitute the severally necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for restoring warrant to theistic belief.
As already noted a person who continues to hold theistic belief with the same
degree of firmness in the presence of defeaters is subject to cognitive malfunction. What
is required here is a defeater-defeater. For some it may be that their basic theistic
belief is an intrinsic defeater-defeater. For others extrinsic defeater-defeaters will be
required, and some will be undercutters and others rebutters. Therefore, for many people
reasons to believe that initial defeaters to theistic belief are not efficacious, or
reasons to believe that theistic beliefs are true, may be necessary for remaining
warranted in particular theistic beliefs, or at least warranted to a degree sufficient for
transforming true belief into knowledge.
There is obviously the contributory role which propositional grounds may play here.
There may be situations in which, as a result of defeaters, theistic belief is sustained
by both experiential and propositional grounds. The design plan may call for the sorts of
evidential situations developed in the last chapter. Given the no-defeater condition, a
person who believes at t1 that he has a partial defeater for his basic theistic
belief will be rational in holding his theistic belief at t2 with the degree of
firmness he did before acquiring the defeater only if it is (at least) partly sustained at
t2 by propositional evidence (assuming that this is not a case of an intrinsic
defeater-defeater). Moreover, where an undercutting defeater-defeater is not sufficient
even to partly sustain the theistic belief, it would seem that a rebutting defeater is
necessary. So natural theology would be crucial for S’s remaining rational in holding
his theistic belief with the degree of firmness he does. But the account asks for a
further step to be made. Reasons may become sufficient grounds for (at least some of) a
person’s theistic beliefs. This will be the case not merely because of the
no-defeater condition, but because of the range of cognitive malfunctions to which the
SD-module is subject. The SD-module was designed for a certain epistemic environment, and
it is not an overstatement to say that Hume has complicated that environment.[18] To drop Pauline theology in the lap of the
epistemological discussion: By one man sin entered the world and by sin objections to
theistic belief, and so defeated theistic belief passed over many people. For some of
these people it may necessary that their theistic belief receive support (partial or
total) from other sources of belief if they are to remain warranted in their theistic
belief. Justification may be by faith; warrant may require reasons.
The conclusion I reach then is
malfunction in the SD-module (and the defeater system) significantly increases the
importance of reasons and mediate warrant for theistic belief. Put more strikingly (for
those of a Reformed theological orientation): if total depravity is true, then natural
theology is necessary.
[D3]
Given any person S, if S suffers from SD theistic malfunctions ([M1]-[M6]),
then reasons may either contribute to warranted basic belief or may constitute the sole
(sufficient) ground for theistic belief.
An objection to the present argument is that it fails to take into consideration
the implications of the noetic effects of sin on the rest of the human cognitive system.
Advocates of total depravity within the Reformed theological tradition will emphasize this
point. The SD-module is not the only part of man’s cognitive establishment that has
been affected by sin. Man’s reasoning in the broadest sense has been corrupted by
sin. The prospects of mediate natural knowledge of God are as problematic as immediate
natural knowledge of God.
The appropriate response to this objection is to clarify the doctrine of total
depravity. Man is not as bad as he can be, but every aspect of his being is pervaded by
the influence of sin.[19] Fine and well. Does it
follow that every faculty is equally affected by malfunction as a result of this
influence? Perhaps an analogy can be drawn from the volitional and moral effects of sin.
The effects of sin on humans will lead some people to steal, others to commit murder, and
others to fail to offer God the worship due Him. Point being, not every person is affected
by sin in the same way such that each commits the same sins or has the same propensities
toward the same wrong doing. Likewise, the noetic effects of sin are manifold and
instantiated in different ways in different people. Some people may be unable to form
belief in God in a mediate fashion; others might be unable to form belief in God in an
immediate fashion. In some sin prevents belief in God altogether (sometimes only for a
time; at other times for a person’s whole life). Others are unable to see how certain
evidence counts for or against the existence of God. Others see this but are not thereby
moved to piety and the love and worship of God.[20]
The noetic effects of sin are not invariable under their instantiations, even as
moral effects are not. What we must say I think is that different segments or modules of a
person’s noetic structure may be affected, to different degrees, and with a
multiplicity of results.[21] Epistemic
corruption or malfunction of the SD-module leaves open in principle the possibility that
other modules of one’s noetic structure might
nonetheless allow one to assess evidence and form belief in God on the basis of reasons.
The existence of God may not be evident in the SD triggering conditions but it may be made
evident by argument. Total depravity, then, rather than militating against natural
theology actually supports the development of theistic arguments.
Let us say, then, that a noetic structure has a potential theistic path just if theistic relevant
evidence is (or at least can be) generated or sustained by some cognitive module. The path
will be actual if the evidence is both generated
and taken account of in the formation or sustenance of a theistic belief at some point. So
where the potential path from the SD-module to theistic belief is fractured or in some way
defective, some people will have other theistic paths and these may prove necessary for their forming or holding some theistic belief in
some circumstance(s).
[D4] There are some people S* such that (a) S* suffer from some warrant (or epistemic) defeating SD-module malfunction, (b) there is some theistic path generated or sustained by some other (at least) minimally properly functioning cognitive module(s) M, and (c) S*'s belief that Pt is warranted only if it is based on evidence from M.[22]
It follows from [D4] that (so far as the
post-lapsarian snapshot design plan is concerned) for some people in some circumstances
reasons will be necessary for their belief in
God to have warrant (or indeed necessary even for some people to have a belief in God at
all). And where these reasons provide adequate support for theistic belief, believing on
the basis of these reasons will be both necessary and sufficient for warranted theistic
belief. A further consequence is this: for the same people a noetic structure in which
theistic belief is nonbasic will be epistemically superior to one in which, if they
believe, theistic belief is basic. For it will be possible for some people who believe in
God in a basic way to do so without that belief being properly basic (i.e., basic and rational), while if
they believe on the basis of adequate reasons the module(s) responsible for theistic
belief will be functioning properly.
So we may deduce the following two principles from the preceding discussion.
[R5]
For some people S* in some complex circumstance C*, S*'s belief that Pt is
warranted and/or rational if and only if it is wholly based on adequate reasons (generated
by a cognitive module which produces or sustains theistic relevant evidence), and where C*
includes warrant defeating malfunction (from the set [M1]-[M6])
on the SD-module.
[R6]
For some people S* in some complex circumstance C*, a noetic structure N1
in which S*'s belief that Pt is wholly nonbasic is synchronically epistemically superior
to a noetic structure N2 in which S*'s belief that Pt is wholly or partly
basic, and where C* at least includes warrant defeating malfunction (from the M-set) on
the SD-module.
IV. Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to establish two main claims. First, given the numerous ways that the SD-module may malfunction (in fact does for various people), mediate modes of theistic belief formation and sustenance become very important for the rational and warranted status of theistic belief, even to the point where reasons constitute the sufficient basis for belief in God. Secondly, defeater system malfunctions suggest that a person may not be rational in continuing to hold theistic belief (or to hold it with a certain degree of firmness) as basic given the appropriate sort of defeater. Given this sort of malfunction though, the possession of propositional evidence in the form of undercutting or rebutting defeater-defeaters becomes necessary for rationality. As in the last chapter, I have further considered the complex factors involved in determining whether a rebutting or undercutting defeater is needed for rationality given that S believes that he has a defeater for his theistic belief (and assuming that his theistic belief is not an intrinsic defeater-defeater). The argument from SD-module cognitive malfunction provides confirmation for the kinds of conclusions reached in the prior chapter regarding the epistemic necessity and superiority of partial sustaining and overdetermining reasons for theistic belief. Moreover, I believe there is a very plausible case for extending those arguments to noetic structures in which theistic belief is wholly nonbasic. If Plantinga’s position on warrant and proper function is true, and we add to it the existential claims of cognitive malfunction, then modest evidentialism seems to be true.