This article is for use only of students enrolled in GPS 520: Advanced Social Psychology for purposes associated with this course and may not be retained or further disseminated.
Higgins, E. T. (1999). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), The Self in Social Psychology. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Self-Discrepancy:
A Theory Relating Self and Affect
(p. 150)
The notion that people who hold conflicting or I
incompatible beliefs are likely to experience discomfort has had a long history
in psychology. In social psychology, for example, various early theories
proposed a relation between discomfort and specific kinds of
"inconsistency" among a person's beliefs (e.g., Abelson &
Rosenberg, 1958; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; McGuire, 1968; Newcomb, 1968;
Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). And various classic theories relating self and
affect proposed that self-conflicts or self-inconsistencies produce emotional
problems (e.g., Adler,1964; Allport, 1955; Cooley, 1902/1964; Freud, 1923/1961;
Horney, 1939, 1946; James, 1890/ 1948; Lecky, 1961; Mead, 1934; Rogers, 1961).
The theory to be presented here, self-discrepancy theory, has close ties to this
historical tradition. But its construction was guided by a distinct set of aims:
(a) to distinguish among different kinds of discomfort that people holding
incompatible beliefs may experience, (b) to relate different kinds of emotional
vulnerabilities systematically to different types of discrepancies that people
may possess among their self-beliefs, and (c) to considerthe role of both the
availability and the accessibility of different discrepancies people may possess
in determining the kind of discomfort they are most likely to suffer.
(p. 151)
Although many different types of belief incompatibility
have been described in the literature for example, dissonance (e.g., Aronson,
1969; Festinger 1957), imbalance (e.g., Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1968),
incongruity (e.g., Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955), and self-inconsistency (e.g.,
Epstein, 1980; Lecky, 1961)-the emotional consequences have typically been
described only in very general terms, such as tension, unpleasantness, pressure,
conflict, stress, or discomfort. And yet it is clear from the general
psychological literature that distinct emotional clusters or syndromes exist.
From factor analysis, cluster analysis, and circular scaling, researchers have
reported that dissatisfaction, feeling discouraged, feeling pitiful, feeling
sad, feeling gloomy, and feeling miserable tend to cluster (e.g., Cattell, 1973;
DeRivera, 1977; Ewert, 1970; Kemper, 1978; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965), whereas
guilt, anxiety, worry, fear, feeling tense, feeling alarmed, and feeling
threatened form another cluster (Ausubel, 1955; Bibring, 1953; Cattell, 1973;
DeRivera, 1977; Ewert, 1970; Kemper, 1978; Russell, 1980; Zuckerman & Lubin,
1965). This basic distinction between dejection-related emotions and
agitation-related emotions has also been made frequently in the clinical
literature, not only to distinguish between depression and anxiety but also to
distinguish between different kinds of depression (see, e.g., Beck, 1967,1983;
Cameron, 1963; White, 1964).
Thus previous theories of belief incompatibility are
limited in that they do not consider that distinct kinds of discomfort may be
associated with belief incompatibility. These theories, then, cannot predict
which kind of discomfort or emotional problem will be induced by a particular
type of belief incompatibility. In addition, the possibility does not arise that
chronic individual differences in type of belief incompatibility may be related
to individual differences in emotional vulnerability. Indeed, among theories
concerned with self-evaluation, theories of vulnerability to generally positive
or negative emotions are relatively common, such as theories of achievement
motivation (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, 196 1), but theories vulnerability
to different kinds of negative emotions are rare. And those that have been
proposed tend to describe emotional vulnerability in terms of problem areas,
such as interpersonal dependency problems versus achievement or self-efficacy
problems, rather than to relate emotional vulnerability to specific types of
incompatible beliefs (e.g. ' Beck, 1983; Blatt, D'Afflitti, & Quinlan,
1976). A primary purpose of self-discrepancy theory, then, is to predict which
types of incompatible beliefs will induce which kinds of negative emotions.
Another purpose is to consider whether the availability
and accessibility of different types of incompatible beliefs induce different
kinds of discomfort. Incompatible beliefs are cognitive constructs, and as such
they can vary in both their availability and their accessibility. Construct
availability refers to the particular kinds of constructs that are actually
present (i.e., available) in memory to be used to process new information,
whereas construct accessibility refers to the readiness with which each stored
construct is used in information processing (see Higgins & Bargh, 1987;
Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Individual
differences can arise either because people have different types of constructs
available or because they have the same types available but their relative
accessibilities differ.
Common to theories of belief incompatibility is the
assumption that the incompatibility reflects a particular type of psychological
situation that influences its possessor's responses. Thus, these theories
compare persons who do or do not possess the particular belief incompatibility
(e.g., cognitive dissonance, imbalance) and thus are or are not likely to
respond in terms of the psychological situation associated with it. These
theories, then, compare only whether a particular (negative) psychological
situation is or is not available and thus are limited by considering only the
absence or presence of one basic type of psychological situation.
In contrast, Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs
proposed that individuals vary widely in the particular types of psychological
situations available to them; that is, there is a wide variety of personal
viewpoints or ways of construing the world (see also Lewin, 1935). But Kelly did
not relate different types of available constructs to different types of
emotional vulnerability. And neither Kelly's nor any other theory of belief
incompatibility distinguished between individual differences in construct
availability and individual differences in construct accessibility. Following
Kelly, individual differences in personal constructs have been commonly
conceived as differences in the nature and content of people's constructs, in
the viewpoint people have of social objects and events (e.g,, Markus, 1977;
Sarbin, Taft, & Bailey, 1960; Tagiuri, 1969). Such differences constitute
differences in the availability of social constructs. Higgins et al. (1982)
proposed that the accessibility of social constructs can also differ,
momentarily or chronically.
(p. 152)
Considerable evidence indicates that various contextual factors, such as prior exposure to construct-related stimuli (i.e., priming), can produce temporary individual differences in the accessibility of generally available social constructs (e.g., common trait constructs, such as "stubborn" or "hostile") and that these differences in turn can produce differences in subsequent responses to social stimuli (for reviews, see Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Higgins& King, 198 1; Wyer & Srull, 1981). There is also evidence that chronic individual differences in construct accessibility can influence social information processing (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985; Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Higgins et al., 1982). Another important purpose of self-discrepancy theory, then, is to introduce construct accessibility as a predictor of when available types of incompatible beliefs (and which of the available types) will induce discomfort.
Self-Discrepancy Theory
Over the years many different facets of the self or
self-images have been identified. One finds descriptions of two
"actual" selves-the kind of person an individual believes he or she
actually is and the kind of person an individual believes that others think he
or she actually is. The "others" can be significant others or the
generalized other (see Erikson, 1950/1963; Lecky, 1961; Mead, 1934; Wylie,
1979). In addition to these actual selves, a variety of different potential
selves have been identified (e.g., Markus & Nurius, 1987).
James (1890/1948), for example, distinguished between the "spiritual" self, which included one's own moral sensibility and conscience, and the "social" self, which included the self that is worthy of being approved by the highest social judge. Rogers (196 1) distinguished between what others believe a person should or ought to be (i.e., the; normative standard) and a person's own belief about what he or she would "ideally" like to be. Elaborating on Freud's (1923/1961) basic "super_ ego"/"ego ideal" conceptions, Schafer (1967) and Piers and Singer (197 1) distinguished between the superego representing the moral conscience and the ideal self representing hopes and goals (see also Cameron, 1963). Cooley (1902/1964) al,, described a social "ideal self' built up by imagining how a "better I" of aspiration would appear in the minds of persons we look up to. In his programmable theory of cognition and affect, Colby (1968) distinguished between "wish-beliefs," such as "I want to marry Tom," and "value-beliefs," such as "I ought to help my father." Although a variety of aspects of the self have been distinguished across different theories (see Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984), there has been no systematic framework for revealing the interrelations among the different self-states. In an attempt to do so, self-discrepancy theory postulates two cognitive dimensions underlying the various self-state representations: domains of the self and standpoints on the self.
Domains of the Self
There are three basic domains of the self: (a) the actual
self, which is your representation of the attributes that someone (yourself or
another) believes you actually possess; (b) the ideal self, which is your
representation of the attributes that someone (yourself or another) would like
you, ideally, to possess (i.e., representation of someone's hopes, aspirations,
or wishes for you); and (c) the ought self, which is your representation of the
attributes that someone (yourself or another) believes you should or ought to
possess (i.e., a representation of someone's sense of your duty, obligations, or
responsibilities).
The distinction proposed here between the ideal self and
the ought self is reflected in various distinctions suggested in the literature
(e.g., Colby, 1968; James, 1890/1948; Piers & Singer, 1971; Rogers, 1961;
Schafer, 1967). In an extensive discussion of the difference between moral
conscience and personal ideals, Schafer (1967) cogently argued that "ideals
and superego morality have been confined together when each should long ago have
had a place of its own" (p. 13 1). A classic literary example of the
difference between the ideal self and the ought self is the conflict between a
hero's ,,personal wishes" and his or her "sense of duty." A
current real-world example is the conflict some women have between their own
wishes to be successful professionals and some other persons' beliefs that they
ought to be housewives and mothers.
(p. 153)
Standpoints on the Self
It is not enough to distinguish among different domains
of self if one wishes systematically to relate self and affect. One must also
discriminate among self-state representations by considering whose perspective
on the self is involved. There are two basic standpoints on the self, where a
standpoint on the self is defined as a point of view from which you can be
judged that reflects a set of attitudes or values (see Turner, 1956): (a) your
own personal standpoint, and (b) the standpoint of some significant other (e.g.,
mother, father, sibling, spouse, closest friend). A person can have self-state
representations for each of a number of significant others.
Except for theories focusing solely on the actual self,
previous theories of the self have not systematically considered the different
domains of self in terms of the different standpoints on those domains (e.g.,
your beliefs concerning the attributes you would personally like ideally to
possess versus your beliefs concerning the attributes that some significant
other person, such as your mother, would like you ideally to possess). In fact,
this failure to be explicit about which standpoint on the self is involved in a
particular self-concept has led to confusions in the literature. For example,
although most measures of "low self-esteem" have involved comparing a
person's actual self and his or her own ideal self, some measures have involved
comparing a person's actual self and his or her beliefs about others' ideals for
him or her (often referred to as the "social ideal self' in the
literature), and other measures have been ambiguous concerning whose ideal
standpoint is involved (see ,,Wylie, 1979).
In addition to Turner's (1956) work, the concept of
standpoint is found in some writings on the impact of reference groups on
self-judgment, where a "normative reference group" is described as a
source of a person's values or perspectives (see Kelley, 1952). In discussing
"level of aspiration" Lewin (1935) distinguished between the
expectations of adult authority figures that can raise a child's level of
aspiration (i.e., "other" standpoints) and a child's own hopes and
personal goals (i.e., "own" standpoint). The notion of standpoint is
also implicit in Mead's (1934) discussion of the development of the self, where
a person's own recognition of self as distinct from others develops from the
viewpoint of significant others (usually a child's mother and father). Mead,
however, did not make clear to what extent the different standpoints on self
remain distinct, and, in fact, suggested that in later development a person's
self-concept becomes based on the viewpoint of "generalized others"
rather than particular others.
In contrast to the relatively rare use of the distinction
between "own" versus "other" standpoints in classifying
different types of self-state representations, the distinction between
"own" versus "other" has frequently been used as a critical
feature in various systems for classifying emotions (e.g., Dahl, 1979; DeRivera,
1977; Freud, 1915/ 1957; Kemper, 1978; Roseman, 1984) and distinguishing among
motivations (e.g., Breckler & Greenwald, 1986; Buss, 1980; Scheier &
Carver, 1983; Snyder, 1979). By incorporating the distinction between
"own" and "other" as a feature for classifying self-state
representations, we can relate different emotional/motivational conditions to
different self-state conditions (as described later).
Self-State Representations and Their Motivational
Significance
Combining each of the domains of the self with each of
the standpoints on the self yields six basic types of self-state
representations: actual/own, actual/other, ideal/own, ideal/other, ought/own,
and ought/other. The first two self-state representations (particularly
actual/own) constitute what is typically meant by a person's self-concept (see
Wylie, 1979). The four remaining self-state representations are self-directive
standards or acquired guides for being-in brief, self-guides (see Higgins,
Strauman, & Klein, 1986, for a review of different kinds of standards).
Self-discrepancy theory proposes that people differ as to which self-guide they
are especially motivated to meet. Not everyone is expected to possess all of the
self-guides-some may possess only ought self-guides, whereas others may possess
only ideal self-guides.
(p. 154)
Self-discrepancy theory postulates that we are motivated
to reach a condition where our self-concept matches our personally relevant
self-guides. The notion that standards, particularly ideal and ought standards,
are motivating has a long history. James (1890/1948) pointed out that standards
both directly prompt action and, through their use in self-evaluation, arouse
emotions that are themselves motivating. Theories of level of aspiration,
although focusing on the relation between performance and standard setting (see
Festinger, 1942; Lewin, 1935; Rotter, 1942), have traditionally assumed that
people need high "ideal" goals or aspiration levels in order to
motivate performance. Control theory or cybernetics (see Miller, Galanter &
Pribram, 1960; Wiener, 1948) assumes that people self-regulate through a
discrepancy-reducing negative feedback process whose function is to minimize
differences between one sensed value (which could be a self-concept) and some
other reference value or standard of comparison (which could be a self-guide).
Duval and Wicklund's (1972) theory of objective self-awareness argues that
increasing self-focused attention increases our awareness of discrepancies
between our real self and personal standards of correctness, subsequently
inducing a motivation to reduce the discrepancy (see also Wicklund &
Gollwitzer, 1982). And Carver and Scheier's control-theory approach to
behavioral self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Scheier &
Carver, 1982), which integrates both of these latter two perspectives,
emphasizes the motivational significance of matching to standards.
Self-discrepancy theory differs from these other theories
in proposing that different types of chronic discrepancies between the
self-concept and different self-guides, as well as between different
self-guides, are associated with different motivational predispositions. It is
not possible in this article to consider all of the possible types of
self-discrepancies (e.g., ideal/own vs. ought/other).' An especially important
set of self-discrepancies is the set that reflects a discrepancy between an
individual's self-concept and his or her self-guides. This set of
self-discrepancies has also received the most empirical attention. In this
article, therefore, we focus on the following four types of discrepancies:
actual/own:ideal/own, actual/own:ideal/other, actual/own: ought/own, and
actual/own: ought/ other.
Types of Self-Discrepancies and Quality of Discomfort
Although self-discrepancies might be considered to constitute a form of belief inconsistency, the source of discrepancy-induced discomfort is not assumed to be simply a failure to achieve internal:,, consistency or a "good Gestalt fit." Indeed, if this was assumed to be the only source of the discomfort, then self-discrepancy theory, like previous). inconsistency theories, would not predict that different types of discrepancies induce different kinds of discomfort. But as Abelson (1983) has pointed out with respect to Heider's (1958) balance theory,... and Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance A, theory, inconsistencies among cognitions reflecting personal costs and problems-not simp cognitive experiences. Self-discrepancy theory shares, this perspective (see also Holt, 1976; mper, 1978; Plutchik, 1962; Schlenker, 1985) b assum ing that each type of discrepancy reflects a particular type of negative psychological situation that is associated with specific emotional/motivational problems.
When people believe that they have lost or will never obtain some desired goal, they feel sad or disappointed. When people believe that something terrible is going to happen they feel apprehensive or threatened. More generally, there are two basic kinds of negative psychological situations that are-, associated with different kinds of emotional states (see, for example, Jacobs, 1971; Lazarus, 1968; Mowrer, 1960; Roseman, 1984; Stein & Jewett, 1982): (a) the absence of positive outcomes (actual or expected), which is associated with dejection-related emotions (e.g., dissatisfaction, disappointment, sadness); and (b) the presence Of negative outcomes (actual or expected), which is associated with agitation-related emotions (e-g., fear, threat, edginess). It has been understood for many years that psychological situations are a function of both the nature of external events and people's interpretations of those events (see, for example, Asch, 1952; Lewin, 195 1; Merton, 1957), and that there are individual differences in how external events are interpreted (see, for example 1955; G. S. Klein, 1970; Murray, 1938; see also Coyne & Lazarus, 1980). Self-discrepancy theory proposes that individual differences in types of self-discrepancies are associated with differences in the specific types of negative psychological situations their possessors are likely to experience.
(p. 155)
Just as your emotional response to your performance is
not determined by the properties of the "performance per se, but by its
significance or meaning to you, self-discrepancy theory assumes that the
motivational or emotional effects of your actual/own attributes, or
self-concept, are determined by the significance to you of possessing such
attributes. And the significance is assumed to depend on the relation between
the self-concept and your self-guides, with different types of relations
representing different types of negative psychological situations, as described
next:
1.
Actual/own versus ideal/own: If a person possesses this discrepancy, the current
state of his or her actual attributes, from the person's own standpoint, does
not match the ideal state that he or she personally hopes or wishes to attain.
This discrepancy then represents the general psychological situation of the
absence of positive outcomes (i.e., nonobtainment of own hopes and desires), and
thus the person is predicted to be vulnerable to dejection-related emotions.
More specifically, the person
is predicted to be vulnerable to disappointment and dissatisfaction because
these emotions are associated with people believing that their personal hopes or
wishes have been unfulfilled. Most psychological analyses of these emotions have
described them as being associated with (a) the individual's own standpoint or
agency (e.g., James, 1890/ 1948; Kemper, 1978; Roseman, 1984; Wierzbicka, 1972)
and (b) a discrepancy from his or her hopes, desires, or ideals (e.g., Abelson,
1983; Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Durkheim, 1951; Duval & Wicklund, 1972;
Horney, 1950; James, 1890/1948; Kemper, 1978; Rogers, 1961; Wierzbicka, 1972).
The motivational nature of this discrepancy also suggests that it might be
associated with frustration from unfulfilled desires.
2.
Actual/own versus ideal/other: If a person possesses this discrepancy, the
current state of his or her actual attributes, from the person's own standpoint,
does not match the ideal state that the person believes some significant other
person hopes or wishes that he or she would attain. This discrepancy, then,
again represents the general psychological situation of the absence of positive
outcomes (i.e., nonobtainment of a significant other's hopes or wishes), and
thus the person is again predicted to be vulnerable to dejection-related
emotions.
More specifically, because
people who believe that they have failed to obtain some significant other's
hopes or wishes are likely to believe that the significant other is disappointed
and dissatisfied with them, self-discrepancy theory predicts that they will be
vulnerable to shame, embarrassment or feeling downcast, because these emotions
are associated with people believing that they have lost standing or esteem in
the opinion of others. Most psychological analyses of "shame" and
related emotions have described them as being associated with (a) the standpoint
or agency of one or more other people (e.g., Ausubel, 1955; Cooley, 1902/1964;
DeRivera, 1977; Lewis, 1979; Piers& Singer, 197 1; Wierzbicka, 1972) and (b)
a discrepancy from achievement or status standards (e.g., Cooley, 1902/1964;
DeRivera, 1977; Erikson, 1950/1963; Kemper, 1978; Piers & Singer, 1971).
Some analyses describe shame as being associated discrepancy from both moral and
nonmoral standards (e.g., Ausubel, 1955; Lewis, 1979). The motivational nature
of this discrepancy suggests that it might also be associated with concern over
losing the affection or esteem of others.
3.
Actual/own versus ought/other: If a person possesses this discrepancy, the
current state of his or her actual attributes, from the person's own standpoint,
does not match the state that person believes some significant other person
considers to be his or her duty or obligation to attain. Because violation of
prescribed duties and obligations is associated with sanctions (e.g.,
punishment), this discrepancy represents the general psychological situation of
the presence of negative outcomes (i.e., expectation of punishment), and thus
the person is predicted to be vulnerable to agitation-related emotions
More specifically, the person
is predicted to be vulnerable to fear and feeling threatened, because these
emotions occur when danger or harm is anticipated or impending. Most
psychological analyses of these emotions have described them as associated with
(a) external agents, in particular the standpoint or agency of one or more other
people (e.g., Abelson, 1983; Ausubel, 1955; DeRivera, 1977; Freud, 1923/1961;
Kemper, 1978; Piers & Singer, 1971; Sullivan, 1953), and (b) a discrepancy
from norms or moral standards (e.g., Ausubel, 1955; Dahl, 1979; Freud, 1923/196
1; Kemper, 1978; Piers & Singer, 1971; Sullivan, 1953). The motivational
nature of this discrepancy suggests that it might also be associated with
feelings of resentment (i.e., resentment of the anticipated pain to be inflicted
by others).
(p. 156)
4. Actual/own versus
ought/own: If a person possesses this discrepancy, the current state of his or
her attributes, from the person's own standpoint, does not match the state that
the person believes it is his or her duty or obligation to attain. This
discrepancy, then, again represents the general psychological situation of the
presence of negative outcomes (i.e., a readiness for self-punishment), and thus
self-discrepancy theory predicts that the person is vulnerable to
agitation-related emotions
More specifically, the person
is predicted to be vulnerable to guilt, self-contempt and uneasiness, because
these feelings occur when people believe they have transgressed a personally
accepted (i.e., legitimate) moral standard. Most psychological analyses of guilt
have described it as associated with (a) a person's own standpoint or agency
(e.g., Ausubel, 1955; Erikson, 1950/1963; Freud, 1923/196 1; James, 1890/1948;
Kemper, 1978; Lewis, 1979; Piers & Singer, 1971) and (b) a discrepancy from
his or her sense of morality or justice (e.g., Ausubel, 1955; Erikson,
1950/1963; Freud, 1923/1961; Homey, 1939; James, 1890/1948; Kemper, 1978; Lewis,
1979; Piers & Singer, 197 1). The motivational nature of this discrepancy
suggests that it may be associated with feelings of moral worthlessness or
weakness.
The distinction between shame and guilt suggested here is
that shame involves feeling that one has been lowered in the esteem of others
because one has disappointed them by failing to accomplish their hopes and
wishes for one, whereas guilt involves feeling that one has broken one's own
rules concerning how one ought to conduct one's life. This distinction is
consistent with previous discussions of the difference between shame and guilt
(e.g., Erikson, 1950/1963; James, 1890/
The distinction between fear and guilt suggested here is
that fear involves anticipating sanctions from others for having violated their
rules, whereas guilt involves chastising oneself for having broken one's own
rules of conduct. This distinction between fear and guilt is consistent with
those previously made in the psychological literature on emotions (e.g., Ausubel,
1955; Freud, 1923/196 1; Kemper, 1978).
As I mentioned earlier, self-discrepancy theory does not
assume that people possess only one or the other of these types of
self-discrepancies. Particular individuals can possess none of them, all of
them, or any combination of them. Thus ' one can have no emotional
vulnerability, only one (i.e., a pure case), or a number of different kinds of
emotional vulnerabilities. Moreover, even if a person possesses more than one
type of self-discrepancy, and thus more than one kind of emotional
vulnerability, the discrepancies are not necessarily equally active and equally
likely to induce discomfort. In order to determine which types of discrepancies
a person possesses and which are likely to be active and induce their associated
emotions at any point, we must consider the next feature of self-discrepancy
theory: distinguishing between the availability and the accessibility of
self-discrepancies.
Availability and Accessibility of Self-Discrepancies
(p. 157)
The availability of any particular type of
self-discrepancy is assumed to depend on the extent to which the attributes of
the two conflicting self-state, representations diverge for the person in
question. Each attribute in one of the self-state representations (e.g.,
actual/own) is compared to each attribute in the other self-state representation
(e.g., ideal/own). Each pair of attributes is coded as either a match (i.e.,
synonymous attributes of the same or similar degree) or a mismatch (i.e.,
antonymous attributes, such as actual/own: "unattractive 11 vs. ideal/own:
"attractive," and synonymous attributes of very different degrees,
such as actual/own: "slightly attractive" vs. ideal/own:
"extremely attractive").
The greater the difference between the number of
mismatches and the number of matches (i.e., the greater the divergence of
attributes between the two self-state representations), the greater is the
magnitude of that type of self-discrepancy available to the subject. And the
greater the magnitude of a particular type of discrepancy, the greater will be
the intensity of the kind of discomfort associated with the discrepancy when it
is activated. The likelihood that an available self-discrepancy will be
activated in turn depends on its accessibility.
The accessibility of an available self-discrepancy is
assumed to depend on the same factors that determine the accessibility of any
stored construct (for reviews, see Higgins & King, 1981; Higgins, Bargh,
& Lombardi, 1985; Wyer & Srull, 1981). One factor is how recently the
construct has been activated. For example, it has been demonstrated that
exposure to trait labels in a prior ,'unrelated" task (a priming
manipulation) increases the likelihood that subjects will subsequently interpret
a target person's ambiguous behaviors in terms of the particular constructs
activated by the labels (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull &
Wyer, 1979; see also Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). As Abelson (1959) pointed
out, there are numerous inconsistencies in anyone's belief system that may lie
dormant, and it is plausible to assume that pressure operates only when the
issue is salient (e.g., when the self-discrepancy has been contextually primed).
It has also been shown that the more frequently a
construct is activated, the more likely it will be used subsequently to
interpret social events (e.g., Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Srull &
Wyer, 1979, 1980). The influence of frequency of activation is also reflected in
the effects of chronic individual differences in construct accessibility on
social interpretation and memory (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985; Higgins et al.,
1982).
The accessibility, or likelihood of activation, of a
stored construct also depends on the relation between its "meaning"
and the properties of the stimulus event. A stored construct will not be used to
interpret an event unless it is applicable to the event (see Higgins & Bargh,
1987; Higgins et al., 1977). Thus, the negative psychological situation
represented in a self-discrepancy (i.e., the "meaning" of the
discrepancy) will not be activated by an unambiguously positive event. And a
self-discrepancy need not have high prior accessibility in order to be used to
interpret a negative event if the event instantiates the discrepancy's
"meaning" clearly enough. In sum, the accessibility of a
self-discrepancy is determined by its recency of activation, its frequency of
activation, and its applicability to the stimulus event.
I should note that self-discrepancy theory does not assume that people are aware of either the availability or the accessibility of their self-discrepancies. It is clear that the availability and accessibility of stored social constructs can influence social information processing automatically and without awareness (see Bargh, 1984; Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Higgins & King, 198 1; Kelly, 1955). Thus, self-discrepancy theory assumes that the available and accessible negative psychological situations embodied in one's self-discrepancies can be used to assign meaning to events without one's being aware of either the discrepancies or their impact on processing. The measure of self-discrepancies requires only that one be able to retrieve attributes of specific self-state representations when asked to do so. It does not require that one be aware of the relations among these attributes or of their significance.
General Hypothesis of Self-Discrepancy Theory
A number of implications follow from the set of
assumptions above:
1.
Individual differences in which types of self-discrepancies are available
will be associated with individual differences in the kinds of discomfort that
people will suffer (i.e., individual differences in emotional vulnerability).
(p. 158)
2.
The greater the magnitude of a particular type of self-discrepancy, the
more intensely its possessor will suffer the kind of discomfort associated with
that type of discrepancy.
3.
If a person possesses more than one type of self-discrepancy (i.e., has
more than one type of self-discrepancy available), he or she is likely to suffer
most intensely the kind of discomfort associated with whichever type of
discrepancy has the greatest magnitude.
4.
Individual differences in whichever type of selfdiscrepancy is
temporarily most accessible will be associated with momentary individual
differences in the kinds of discomfort that people will suffer (i.e., individual
differences in emotional episodes).
5.
The greater the accessibility of a particular type of self-discrepancy,
the greater the likelihood that its possessor will suffer the kind of discomfort
associated with that type of discrepancy.
6. If a
person possesses more than one type of self-discrepancy, he or she is most
likely to suffer momentarily the kind of discomfort associated with whichever
type of discrepancy has the greatest temporary accessibility.
These implications of self-discrepancy theory are
captured in the following general hypothesis: The greater the magnitude and
accessibility of a particular type of self-discrepancy possessed by an
individual, the more the individual will suffer the kind of discomfort
associated with that type of self-discrepancy.
(At this point, the article begins a detailed review of current research evidence in support of the theoretical proposals. I have skipped this section (pp. 159-169) to save your attention for what follows. However, I am happy to supply the missing information to anyone interested.)
General Discussion and Conclusions
Self-discrepancy theory shares a long tradition in psychology of models proposing that incompatible beliefs, and particularly self-beliefs, induce discomfort. Self-discrepancy theory, however, has some distinctive features. First, it systematically relates different types of discrepancies between self-state representations to vulnerability to different kinds of discomfort. Second, not only does it consider whether particular types of discrepancy are available to people as a function of the magnitude of the discrepancies, but it also considers the relative accessibility of individuals' available discrepancies. The various assumptions and implications of self-discrepancy theory are captured by the following general hypothesis: The greater the magnitude and accessibility of a particular type of self-discrepancy possessed by an
individual, the more the individual will suffer the kind
of discomfort associated with that type of self-discrepancy.
This hypothesis was tested in a series of correlational
and experimental studies. Consistent with the hypothesis, when either the
magnitude or the accessibility of the subjects' discrepancy between their
self-concepts and their ideal self-guides was greater, the subjects suffered
more from dejection-related emotions (e.g., disappointment, dissatisfaction,
sadness). When either the magnitude or the accessibility of discrepancy between
their self-concepts and their ought self-guides was greater, the subjects
suffered more from agitation-related emotions (e.g., fear, restlessness,
tension).
(p. 170)
The present article has presented the basic assumptions
of self-discrepancy theory in the context of related theories and described
initial empirical support for the theory's major hypothesis. Future research
will need to consider a number of other important issues: (a) how the theory
could be used to predict positive emotions (e.g., we have found that the absence
of an actual/own:ideal/own discrepancy is associated with feeling
"happy" and "satisfied," whereas the absence of an
actual/own: ought/other discrepancy is associated with feeling "calm"
and "secure"); (b) the conditions under which self-guides initiate and
direct action as well as being used as standards for self-evaluation; (c) the
role of people's beliefs concerning the likelihood that they will ever meet
their guides in moderating the motivational and emotional consequences of
possessing self-discrepancies (e.g., the role of perceived self-efficacy; see
Bandura, 1986); and (d) whether different regions of life should be
distinguished when measuring discrepancies in order to predict more accurately
emotional vulnerabilities in each region (e.g., achievement vs. interpersonal).
Even in its current form, however, self-discrepancy
theory has implications for other areas of psychology. For example,
self-discrepancy theory has some implications for treating emotional problems.
Although it is not possible to review these implications
in detail, it is interesting to note that each of the major alternative ways of
reducing self-discrepancies is currently associated with some important approach
to treatment. According to self-discrepancy theory, emotional problems are
associated with accessible discrepancies between people's actual/ own
self-concept and one or more, of their self-guides. Logically, then, there are
three general alternatives for reducing emotional problems induced by
self-discrepancies.
First, one could change a client's actual/own
self-concept to be less discrepant from the client's self-guides. Behavioral
therapeutic approaches accomplish this by modifying clients' persistent,",
performance, and both cognitive and psychodynamic therapeutic approaches
accomplish it by modifying clients' interpretations of their performance.
Second, one could change the client's self-guides to be less discrepant from the
client's actual/own self-concept. Both cognitive and psychodynamic therapeutic
approaches accomplish this by lowering either the level or the perceived
relevance of a self-guide (e.g., by leading, clients to question its fairness,
legitimacy, reasonableness, or utility). Third, one could change the
accessibility of the discrepancies. Behavioral and environmental intervention
approaches accomplish this by reducing clients' exposure to situations and
social interactions that are associated with their problems (i.e., that are
likely to prime the discrepancy). Cognitive approaches accomplish this by having
clients actively rehearse positive thoughts and attitudes, which then function
as active sets that inhibit passive accessibility effects (see Higgins &
King, 1981). Thus, self-discrepancy theory potentially provides a single,
unified framework for understanding the functional consequences of different
kinds of therapeutic approaches-what they do and do not accomplish.
This article has focused on the implications of
self-concept discrepancy theory for self-evaluations and personal emotional
responses. Nevertheless, the theory also has more general implications for
motivation, evaluations of others, and interpersonal relations. People's
emotional reactions to their performance, for example, can influence their
subsequent motivations to achieve (for a review, see Weiner, 1986). Moreover,
individual differences in achievement motivation may reflect individual
differences in which self-guides are accessible and used at different stages of
the process of self-evaluation (Higgins, Strauman, & Klein, 1986). The
differences, for instance, between low and high-resultant achievers described in
the literature (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Kuhl, 1978; Kukla, 1978; Weiner, 1972)
could be due to low achievers' having a tendency to interpret their performance
as a success or a failure on the basis of whether it is above or below their
high ought/other standard, in contrast to high achievers' having a tendency to
interpret their performance as a success or a failure on the basis of a more
moderate factual comparison standard (e.g., their own past performance or the
average performance) and appraising it in relation to their ideal/own standard.
(p. 171)
Thus, low achievers would tend to judge their performance
as a failure and subsequently feel apprehensive and anxious, whereas high
achievers would tend to judge their performance as a success, thereby increasing
their self-confidence, but they would also feel dissatisfied because they had
not yet fulfilled their personal aspirations. This, in turn, would cause low
achievers to avoid subsequent achievement tasks and high achievers to increase
their efforts.
Self-discrepancy theory may also have implications for
individual differences in evaluating others. There is considerable evidence that
people's self-concepts and chronic personal constructs can influence their
judgments and memory of others (e.g., Hastorf, Richardson, & Dornbusch,
1958; Higgins, King & Mavin, 1982; Kelly, 1955; Kuiper & Derry, 198 1;
Markus & Smith, 198 1; Shrauger & Patterson, 1974). If individuals'
self-guides are also used in evaluating others, then self-discrepancy theory
could predict not only whether the judgment is likely to be positive or negative
(i.e., depending on how high are the perceiver's self-guides), but also what the
perceiver's specific emotional response to the target's behavior is likely to
be. For example, a target's behavior that was discrepant from a perceiver's
ideal standards could cause the perceiver to feel dissatisfied and disappointed
with the target or to feel sad for the target, whereas a target's behavior that
was discrepant from a perceiver's ought standards could cause the perceiver to
feel resentful or critical toward the target or to worry about the target.
Similarity between partners in the guides they use to
evaluate themselves and others could promote positive relationships because it
would increase the likelihood of the partners' responding similarly to social
events, which in turn is associated with balanced relationships (e.g., Heider,
195 8; Newcomb, 196 1). On the other hand, similarity between partners in their
self-discrepancies could increase the likelihood that both partners would be
emotionally vulnerable to the same events, which would reduce the ability of
each partner to serve as a "safety zone" for the other. Perhaps
similarity of social evaluative guides but dissimilarity in regions of
vulnerability (e.g., achievement vs. interpersonal) would provide the most
balanced relationship.
Finally, people's emotions in relationships may be
influenced by the role their partner plays in their self-discrepancy system. In
some cases, the partner (e.g., parent, spouse, boss) may be represented directly
as the significant other in an actual:ideal/other or actual: ought/other
discrepancy. In such cases, self-discrepancy theory would predict that the
intensity and kind of emotion a person would be vulnerable to experiencing in
the relationship would be a function of the magnitude and type of his or her
available self-discrepancy involving the partner as significant other. (See
McCann & Higgins, 1988, for evidence supporting this prediction.) In other
cases the partner may not be represented directly as a significant other in an
available self-discrepancy, but the partner may have characteristics (e.g.,
physical and personality attributes; opinions and attitudes; interaction style)
that are subjectively similar to a significant other whose standpoint on their
self is involved in a pre-established "other" discrepancy, and thus
exposure to the partner could activate the discrepancy and its associated
discomfort. If someone attempts to resolve a prior discrepancy through a
relationship with a new person, then we have the makings for a classic neurotic
relationship (i.e., "The relationship makes me miserable, but I feel
somehow that I'm getting a lot out of it"). Moreover, because the dynamic
source of emotional reactions is the pre-established self-discrepancy and not the
partner's actual behavior per se, it explains why the person overreacts to the
situation.
With the exception of such neurotic relationships, one
might predict more generally that people would seek out relationships that
decrease the magnitude or accessibility of their self-discrepancies by modifying
their self-concept and that they would avoid relationships that modify their
self-concept in a way that increases the magnitude or accessibility of their
self-discrepancies. Indeed, even in neurotic relationships, such as those
described by Homey (1939) in her discussion of narcissism, the relationship may
be maintained because it reduces a self-discrepancy or supports an essential
non-discrepancy.
If support for these additional implications of self-discrepancy theory is found in future research, then the theory would have the potential of providing a unified model for addressing central issues that fall on the interface of social, personality, and abnormal psychology.