This article is for use only of students enrolled in GPS 520: Advanced Social Psychology for purposes associated with this course and may not be retained or further disseminated.

Brown, J. D. (1998). The self. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill

CHAPTER 2

The Nature of the Self

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Former President Lyndon Johnson once described himself as "a free man, an American, a United States Senator, a Democrat, a liberal, a conservative, a Texan, a taxpayer, a rancher, and not as young as I used to be nor as old as I expect to be" (cited in Gergen, 1971). Although not everyone thinks of themselves in such varied terms, everyone has a wealth of self-knowledge. They have ideas about their physical qualities and abilities; their social roles; their opinions, talents, and personality traits; and more.

In this chapter, we will examine the nature of the self. Our analysis will rely heavily on the work of William James, who wrote extensively on the topic in chapter 10 of his 1890 publication The Principles of Psychology. James was a philosopher as well as a psychologist, and his work represents a stunning blend of conceptual synthesis, metaphorical analysis, and penetrating observation. More than a century after its appearance, this work stands as the premier publication in American psychology. All serious students of the self must begin by studying James; accordingly, that is where our analysis begins.

The first section of this chapter explores the nature of the ME. Here we will be concerned with understanding what people think of when they answer the question "Who am IT' We will see that many of the ideas William James discussed over 100 years ago still apply today. At the same time, we will see that recent research has extended and refined many of James's ideas.

The second section of this chapter examines the affective and motivational aspects of the self. James devoted considerable attention to understanding the nature of self-feelings and the behaviors these feelings evoke. We will discuss his ideas and also examine recent research that has looked at the relation between various self-views (e.g., who you think you should be) and self-feelings.

The final section of this chapter examines the nature of the I. For centuries philosophers have pondered a philosophical question known as the problem of personal identity. The key question here is whether there is some aspect of self that accounts for the perceived unity of psychological life. William James also addressed this issue, and we will examine his proposed solution. We will also review the solutions offered by two earlier philosophers, John Locke and David Hume, as their attempts to solve the problem of personal identity set the stage for James's analysis.

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Three Components of the Empirical Self

William James used the term "the empirical self" to refer to all of the various ways people think about themselves. His analysis is very broad.

The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is tempted to call by the name of me. But it is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves. Our fame, our children, the work of our hands, may be as dear to us as our bodies are, and arouse the same feelings and the same acts of reprisal if attacked. And our bodies themselves, are they simply ours, or are they us? (p. 291)

James went on to group the various components of the empirical self into three subcategories: (1) the material self, (2) the social self, and (3) the spiritual self.

Material Self

The material self refers to tangible objects, people, or places that carry the designation my or mine. Two subclasses of the material self can be distinguished. These are the bodily self and the extracorporeal (beyond the body) self. Rosenberg (1979) has referred to the extracorporeal self as the extended self, and we will adopt this terminology throughout the book.

THE NATURE OF THE ME

We will begin by considering the nature of the ME. As indicated in Chapter 1, we use this term to refer to people's ideas about who they are and what they are like. Before reading further, take a moment to reflect on how you think about yourself by completing the questionnaire shown in Table 2.1.

TABLE 2.1. Self-Exercise #1

Imagine you want someone to know what you are really like. You can tell this person 20 things about yourself. These can include aspects of your personality, background, physical characteristics, hobbies, things you own, people you are close to, and so forth-in short, anything that helps the person know what you are really like. What would you tell them?

The bodily component of the material self requires little explanation. A person speaks of my arms or my legs. These entities are clearly an intimate part of who we are. But our sense of self is not limited to our bodies. It extends to include other people (my children), pets (my dog), possessions (my car), places (my hometown), and the products of our labors (my painting).

It is not the physical entities themselves, however, that comprise the material self. Rather, it is our psychol i al ownership of them (Scheibe, 1985). For example, a person may have a favorite chair she likes to sit in. The chair itself is not part of the self. Instead, it is the sense of appropriation represented by the phrase "my favorite chair." This is what we mean when we talk about the extended self. It includes all of the people, places, and things that are psychologically part of who we are.

It is interesting to consider why James argued for such a sweeping definition of self. Prior to the time he wrote his book, psychological research on self was restricted to the physical self. Recall from Chapter I that the introspectionists had people report what they were thinking and feeling when exposed to various stimuli. Some of these reports concerned an awareness of one's bodily states. For example, a person might report that "my arms feel heavy" or "my skin feels warm." These are aspects of self. But James wanted to expand the study of self to include nonphysical aspects of the person. He believed that the self was fluid and encompassed more than our physical bodies.

Given this fluidity, how can we tell whether an entity is part of the self? James believed we could make this determination by examining our emotional investment in the entity. If we respond in an emotional way when the entity is praised or attacked, the entity is likely to be part of the self.

In its widest possible sense... a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down-not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all. (pp. 291-292)

Another way to determine whether something is part of the extended self is to see how we act toward it. If we lavish attention on the entity and labor to enhance or maintain it, we can infer that the entity is part of the self.

[All of the components of the material self] are the objects of instinctive preferences coupled with the most important practical interests of life. We all have a blind impulse to watch over our body, to deck it with clothing of an ornamental sort, to cherish parents, wife and babes, and to find for ourselves a home of our own which we may live in and "improve."

An equally instinctive impulse drives us to collect property; and the collections thus made become, with different degrees of intimacy, parts of our empirical selves. The parts of our wealth most intimately ours are those which are saturated with our labor. . . . and although it is true that a part of our depression at the loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we must now go without certain goods that we expected the possessions to bring in their train, yet in every case there remains, over and above this, a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness, which is a psychological phenomenon by itself. (p. 293)

In addition to underscoring the important role motivation plays in identifying what is self from what is not, James also made an interesting point here about the nature of things that become part of the self. These possessions, James argued, are not simply valued for what they provide; they are also prized because they become part of us. "Not only the people but the places and things I know enlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric way," James wrote (p. 308).

A good deal of research supports James's intuitions regarding the close connection between possessions and the self (see Belk, 1988). First, people spontaneously mention their possessions when asked to describe themselves (Gordon, 1968). People also amass possessions. Young children, for example, are avid collectors. They have bottle-cap collections, rock collections, shell collections, and so forth. These collections are not simply treasured for their material value (which is often negligible); instead, they represent important aspects of self. The tendency to treat possessions as part of the self continues throughout life, perhaps explaining why so many people have difficulty discarding old clothes or other possessions that have long outlived their usefulness.

There seem to be several reasons for this. First, possessions serve a symbolic function; they help people define themselves. The clothes we wear, the cars we drive, and the manner in which we adorn our homes and offices signal to ourselves (and others) who we think we are and how we wish to be regarded. People may be particularly apt to acquire and exhibit such signs and symbols when their identities are tenuously held or threatened (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). A recent Ph.D., for example, may prominently display his diploma in an attempt to convince himself (and others) that he is the erudite scholar he aspires to be. These functions support Sartre's (1958) claim that people accumulate possessions to enlarge their sense of self.

Possessions also extend the self in time. Most people take steps to ensure that their letters, photographs, possessions, and mementos are distributed to others at the time of their death. Although some of this distribution reflects a desire to allow others to enjoy the utilitarian value of these artifacts, Unruh (1983, cited in Belk, 1988) has argued that this dispersal also has a symbolic function. People seek immortality by passing their possessions on to the next generation.

People's emotional responses to their possessions also attest to their importance to the self. A person who loses a wallet often feels greater anguish over a lost photograph than over any money that is missing. Similarly, many car owners react with extreme anger (and often rage) when their cars are damaged, even when the damage is only slight in physical terms. Finally, many people who lose possessions in a natural disaster go through a grieving process similar to the process people go through when they lose a person they love (McLeod, 1984, cited in Belk, 1988).

Further evidence that possessions become part of the extended self comes from a series of investigations by Beggan (1992). In an initial study, participants were shown a variety of inexpensive objects (e.g., a key ring, plastic comb, playing cards). They were then given one object and told it was theirs to keep. Later, participants evaluated their object more favorably than the objects they didn't receive. A follow-up investigation found that this tendency was especially pronounced after participants had previously failed at an unrelated experimental test. There are several explanations for this "mere ownership effect," but one possibility is that once possessions become part of the self, we imbue them with value and use them to promote positive feelings of self-worth.

Finally, the tendency to value self-relevant objects and entities even extends to letters of the alphabet. When asked to judge the pleasantness of various letters, people show enhanced liking for the letters that make up their own name, particularly their own initials (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nuttin, 1985, 1987). This "name letter effect" provides further support for James's assertion that our sense of self extends far beyond our physical bodies to include those objects and entities we call ours.

James called the second category of the empirical self the social self. The social self refers to how we are regarded and recognized by others. (I will refer to these aspects of self as a person's social identities.) As before, James's analysis was very broad.

…a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind…But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. (p. 294)

Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier (1995) distinguished five types of social identities: personal relationships (e.g., husband, wife), ethnic/ religious (e.g., African-American, Muslim), political affiliation (e.g., Democrat, pacifist), stigmatized groups (e.g., alcoholic, criminal), and vocation/ avocation (e.g., professor, artist). Some of these identities are ascribed identities (ones we are born with, such as son or daughter) and others are attained identities (ones we acquire in life, such as professor or student).

Each of these identities is accompanied by a specific set of expectations and behaviors. We act differently in the role of "father" than in the role of "professor." Sometimes these differences are minor and unimportant; other times they are considerable and consequential.

Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his "tough" young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command. (p. 294)

The larger point James made here is a critical one. To a great extent, how we think of ourselves depends on the social roles we are playing (Roberts & Donahue, 1994). We are different selves in different social situations. This can cause difficulties when we are confronted with situations in which two or more social selves are relevant. Anyone who has simultaneously been both a parent and a child at a family reunion can attest to the difficulties such situations create. We are also surprised to encounter people we typically see in only one role or situation outside of that usual setting. Students, for example, are often flustered when they see their teachers outside of the classroom (e.g., at a movie, restaurant, or sporting event). They aren't used to seeing their teachers dressed so casually and acting so informally.

The tendency for people to show different sides of themselves in different social settings raises an important question: Is there a stable, core sense of self (that transcends these various social roles? Some theorists have answered this question with an emphatic "no." They have maintained that the self is comprised entirely of our various social roles, and that there is no real, true, or genuine self that exists apart from these social roles (Gergen, 1982; Sorokin, 1947). Many (if not most) other theorists reject this position as too extreme. While acknowledging that people behave differently in different social settings, these theorists also contend that there is a common sense of self that runs through these various social identities. William James was one adherent of this position. James believed that our social roles are one important aspect of self, but they are by no means the sole aspect of self nor the most important.

James went on to make an additional point about these social selves. He posited an instinctive drive to be noticed and recognized by others. We affiliate, James argued, not simply because we like company, but because we crave recognition and status.

A man's Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind. No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. (p. 293)

To summarize, the social self includes the various social positions we occupy and the social roles we play. But it is not simply these identities, per se. It is more importantly the way we think we are regarded and recognized by others. It is how we think others evaluate us. These perceptions will figure prominently in our discussion of the reflected appraisal process in Chapter 3.

The third category in James's scheme is the spiritual self. The spiritual self is our inner self or our psychological self. It is comprised of everything we call my or mine that is not a tangible object, person, or place, or a social role. Our perceived abilities, attitudes, emotions, interests, motives, opinions, traits, and wishes are all part of the spiritual self. (I will refer to these aspects of the spiritual self as our-personal identities. In short, the spiritual self refers to our perceived inner psychological qualities. It represents our subjective experience of ourselves-how it feels to be us.

By the spiritual self ... I mean a man's inner or subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions.... These psychic dispositions are the most enduring and intimate part of the self, that which we most verily seem to be. We take a purer self-satisfaction when we think of our ability to argue and discriminate of our moral sensibility and conscience, of our indomitable will, than when we survey any of our other possessions. (p. 296)

James proposed two different ways of thinking about the spiritual self. One way (which he called the abstract way) is to consider each attribute in isolation, as distinct from the others. The other way (which he called the concrete way) is to consider the attributes as united in a constant stream.

…this spiritual self may be considered in various ways. We may divide it into faculties, . . . isolating them one from another, and identifying ourselves with either in turn. This is an abstract way of dealing with consciousness…; or we may insist on a concrete view, and then the spiritual self in us will be either the entire stream of our personal consciousness, or the present "segment" or "section" of that stream. . . . But whether we take it abstractly or concretely, our understanding the spiritual self at all is a reflective process, . . . the result of our abandoning the outward-looking point of view, and . . . [coming] to think ourselves as thinkers. (p. 296)

Later in this chapter we will see how James used this distinction to address an ancient philosophical debate, known as the problem of personal identity.

Finally, it's of interest to note the close connection between our possessions (which are aspects of the material self) and our emotions, attitudes, and beliefs (which are components of the spiritual self). As Abelson (1986) observed, this similarity is captured in our language. A person is said to have a belief, from the time the belief is first acquired, to the time it is discarded or lost. We also say things like "I inherited a view" or "I can't buy that!" Finally, we speak of people who have abandoned their convictions or disowned an earlier position. These terms imply that possessions and attitudes share an underlying conceptual property: They are both owned by the self (see Gilovich, 1991; Heider, 1956 for an elaboration of this view).

Does James's classification scheme describe the way you think about yourself? To answer this question, try to match the responses you gave to the questionnaire you completed earlier with James's analysis. I have used this questionnaire in my classes at the University of Washington, and I have found that students' answers do reliably fall into one of these three categories. The only trick is deciding which of the three categories is applicable. One way to make this determination is to consider whether the response is a noun or an adjective. Rosenberg (1979) notes that social identities are generally expressed as nouns and serve to place us in a broader social context (e.g., I am an American; I am a Democrat). In contrast, personal identities (aspects of what James called the spiritual self) are usually expressed as adjectives and serve to distinguish us from others (e.g., I am moody; I am responsible).

Gordon (1968) elaborated on James's scheme and produced a coding procedure with 8 major categories and 30 subcategories. This scheme is described in Table 2.2, and it is illustrated with a sample (composite) questionnaire in Table 2.3. You can compare the responses you gave with the ones shown there.

James wrote at a time when psychology was the exclusive province of highly educated (and, by extension, well-to-do) males of European descent. His analysis is therefore somewhat parochial and narrow in scope. This limitation is apparent in the lack of attention James gave to people's ethnic, religious, and racial identities. These identities (termed the collective self by modern researchers) are of great significance to people, particularly those who occupy a minority status. For example, people place great importance on being "Irish," "Jewish," "an African-American," and so forth.

Two related issues regarding these collective identities have received attention. One line of research has focused on how people evaluate these specific identities. Historically, minority status has carried a negative connotation. Minorities have been stigmatized and subject to discrimination. This state of affairs led some minority group members to resent, disavow, or even turn against their ethnic identity (Lewin, 1948).

Recent years have seen a shift in these tendencies. Beginning with the Black Pride movement in the 1960s, minority groups have worked to improve the way their members evaluate their minority status. Rather than viewing their minority status as a stigma, group members are encouraged to celebrate their heritage and view their minority status as a source of pride. These efforts appear to be meeting with success. Most minority group members now evaluate their ethnic identity in positive terms (Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994; Phinney, 1990).

A second line of research has looked at how people maintain their ethnic identities when exposed to a dominant majority culture. Consider children of Latin-American descent who live in the United States today. Their Latin identity is apt to be paramount during their early (pre-school) years, as a result of housing and friendship patterns. Later, when they begin to attend school, they come into contact with the broader American culture. What happens to their ethnic identity then?

Table 2.4 describes four possible outcomes based on the strength of the children's identification with the majority and minority group (Phinney, 1990). Children who adopt the identity of the dominant culture, while still retaining a strong identification with their cultural background, are said to be acculturated integrated, or bicultural. Those who abandon their ethnic identity for an American identity are said to be assimilated. Separation occurs among those who refuse to identify with the dominant culture, and those who lose their ties to both cultural groups are said to be marginalized.

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TABLE 2.4. Four Identity Orientations Based on Degree of Identification with One's Ethnic Group and the Majority Group

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Assimilation was the desired outcome for many turn-of-the century immigrants. These newly arrived Americans sought to completely immerse themselves in American culture and shed their ethnic identity. In so doing, many changed their names, tried to lose their accents, and studiously adopted the customs and mores of American culture.

The situation today is quite different. Cultural diversity and pluralism are celebrated, and many minority group members strive to become acculturated, not assimilated. Phinney (1990) describes several behaviors that facilitate this goal, including participation in ethnic activities, continued use of one's native language, and the forging of friendship patterns with other minority group members. Ethier and Deaux (1994) found that behaviors of this sort helped Hispanic students retain their ethnic identity during their first year in predominantly Anglo universities.

Cultural Differences in Identity Importance

Cultural differences in the importance people attach to their various identities have also been the subject of research. James argued that personal identities (aspects of the spiritual self) are more important to people than are their social identities (aspects of the social self).

This hierarchical scheme varies across cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Western countries (e.g., United States, Canada, and Western European countries) are very individualistic. They are competitive in orientation and emphasize ways in which people are different from one another. This emphasis leads citizens of these countries to place great importance on their personal identities. Eastern cultures (e.g., Japan, China, India), in contrast, tend to be more cooperative, collective, and interdependent. Instead of emphasizing the ways people are different from one another, these cultures emphasize ways in which people are linked together. Accordingly, people raised in these cultures emphasize their social identities.

An investigation by Cousins (1989) documents these tendencies. In this investigation, American and Japanese college students completed a questionnaire similar to the one you filled out earlier, and then placed a check mark next to the five responses they regarded as most self-descriptive. Researchers then classified each of the five responses according to whether it referred to a personal identity (a perceived trait, ability, or disposition), a social identity (a social role or relationship), or something else (e.g., physical characteristic).

Figure 2.1 presents the results of this investigation. The figure shows that the American students listed personal identities (e.g., I am honest; I am smart) 59 percent of the time, but Japanese students did so only 19 percent of the time. In contrast, Japanese students listed social identities (e.g., I am a student; I am a daughter) 27 percent of the time, but American students did so only 9 percent of the time. These findings document cross-cultural differences in the way people think about themselves (see also Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991).

FIGURE 2.1. Identity statements by American and Japanese students in response to a "Who am l?" questionnaire. The data show that American students were more likely than Japanese students to describe themselves in terms of their personal attributes, whereas Japanese students were more likely than American students to describe themselves in terms of their social attributes. These findings document cross-cultural differences in the self-concept.

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Cousins (1989) documented another important cultural difference. People from Western cultures think of themselves as having psychological attributes that transcend particular situations. For example, when asked to describe herself, a person from a Western culture might say "I'm polite." People from Eastern cultures tend to think of themselves in relation to specific others and in specific situations; when asked to describe herself, a person from an Eastern culture might say "I'm polite at school," or "I'm polite with my father." The key difference is that the response of the person from a Western cultural background is unbounded by the situation, but the response of the person from an Eastern cultural background specifies the relational or situational context.

Individual Differences in Identity Importance

Even within cultures, people differ in the importance they attach to their various identities (Cheek, 1989; Dollinger, Preston, O'Brien, & Dilalla, 1996). Before reading further, take a moment to complete the questionnaire shown in Table 2.5. This questionnaire, adapted from one designed by Cheek, Tropp, Chen, and Underwood (1994), measures the weight people give to their various identities. The scale distinguishes three types of identities: personal identities (our perceived inner or psychological qualities), social identities (the way we think we are regarded and recognized by others), and collective identities (our sense of belonging to a larger social group such as our race, ethnic heritage, and religion).

To determine your score, average your responses to the four items that refer to personal identities (items 1, 4, 7, and 10), the four items that refer to social identities (items 2, 5, 8, and 11), and the four items that measure collective identities (items 6,9, and 12). Most American college students score highest on the personal identity items, but not all do. Moreover, Asian-American students place more importance on their collective identities than do European-American students, further demonstrating how cultures shape the way people think about themselves. Finally, there is evidence that, across cultures, the tendency to see oneself in relational terms (which is a component of collectivism in this scale) is more characteristic of women than of men (Kashima et al., 1995; Markus & Oyserman, 1989).

One more issue regarding the nature of the ME merits consideration. To this point, we have discussed the ME as if it consists of a haphazard collection of perceived possessions, social roles, and traits. This is rarely the case. Most (if not all) individuals organize the various aspects of their empirical self into a coherent pattern.

McAdams (1996) has argued that this organization is generally accomplished in the context of a personal narrative. A personal narrative is a story a person (implicitly) constructs about her life. The narrative includes the ways the person thinks of herself, as well as the person's memories, feelings, and experiences. This ongoing story contains many of the literary devices that characterize works of fiction (e.g., plots and subplots, character descriptions). Many stories also feature a critical turning point or self-defining juncture (e.g., to really know me, you need to know why I abandoned a lucrative career as a taxi driver in favor of getting a Ph.D. in psychology). In short, a personal narrative unifies and makes sense of the various aspects of a person's life, including aspects of the empirical self.

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In addition to discussing the nature of the self, William James discussed selffeelings and the motivational aspects of the self (which he called self-seeking and self-preservation). As concerns self-feelings, James believed there are certain emotions that always involve the self as a point of reference. James called these emotions self-complacency and self-dissatisfaction, and he distinguished them from more general emotions, such as happiness and sadness. These selfrelevant emotions include:

... pride, conceit, vanity, self-esteem, arrogance [and] vainglory, on the one hand; and on the other modesty, humility, confusion, diffidence, shame, mortification, contrition, the sense of obloquy, and personal despair. (p. 306)

... direct and elementary endowments of our nature ... each as worthy to be classed as a primitive emotional species as are, for example, rage or pain. (pp.306-307)

Finally, James believed that people have an innate drive to experience these positive feelings and to avoid experiencing these negative feelings.

We know how little it matters to us whether some man, a man taken at large and in the abstract, proves a failure or succeeds in life-he may be hanged for aught we care-but we know the utter momentousness and terribleness of the alternative when the man is the one whose names we ourselves bear. I must not be a failure, is the very loudest of the voices that clamor in each of our breasts: let fail who may, I at least must succeed. . . . each of us is animated by a direct feeling of regard for his own pure principle of individual existence. . . . Whatever is me is precious; this is me; therefore this is precious; whatever is mine must not fail; this is mine; therefore this must not fail, etc. (p. 318)

Having distinguished various self-relevant emotions, James considers how these feelings arise. In an oft-quoted passage, he offers the following formula

Our self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be and do. It is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities; a fraction of which our pretensions are the denominator and the numerator our successes; thus, Self-esteem = Success /Pretensions. (p. 310)

In Chapter 8 of this book we will spend a great deal of time discussing selfesteem. At that point, we will have the opportunity to examine the merits of James's formula. For now, let's simply be clear on what he is saying.

James uses the term pretensions in two distinct ways. Sometimes he uses the term to refer to domains of personal importance.

I who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortified if others know much more psychology than 1. But I am contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek. My deficiencies there give me no sense of personal humiliation at all. Had I "pretensions" to be a linguist, it would have been just the reverse. (p. 310)

Here James is saying that his performance as a psychologist evokes a stronger emotional reaction in him than does his performance as a linguist. In more general terms, he is arguing that outcomes in domains of high personal importance produce greater emotional reactions than do outcomes in domains of low personal importance. This treats pretensions in terms of values, in terms of what is important to the person.

To illustrate, imagine you are taking two classes. One is an elective that you are taking just for fun; the other class is in your major area of study. James's formula suggests that your performance in the latter class (the one that is more important) will evoke a stronger emotional reaction than will your performance in the former class (the one that is unimportant).

In addition to using the term pretensions to refer to what is important to a person, James also uses the term to refer to a person's aspiration level, a minimum level of performance with which a person would be satisfied.

So we have the paradox of a man shamed to death because he is only the second pugilist or the second oarsman in the world. That he is able to beat the whole population of the globe minus one is nothing; he has pitted himself to beat that one; and as long as he doesn't do that nothing else counts. Yonder puny fellow, however, whom every one can beat, suffers no chagrin about it, for he has long ago abandoned the attempt to "carry that line" as the merchants say, of self at all. (pp. 310-311)

This passage treats pretensions in terms of one's level of aspiration. It says that how people feel about an attained outcome is not simply a function of the outcome itself-it depends on the standards people use for gauging success and failure.

By way of illustration, consider two students who both get Bs in a course. One student may be dissatisfied because he expected or wanted an A; the other student may be thrilled because he would have been satisfied with a C. Even though the objective outcome is the same, the two students have completely different emotional reactions. Why? Because as the phenomenological approach tells us, people's reactions to events are determined not simply by the event themselves but also by the meaning people give to the event. This point was recognized by Shakespeare over 400 years ago. In Hamlet, Shakespeare wrote, "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" (act 11, scene 2, line 259). Whether we are elated or dejected to receive a grade of "B" depends on the meaning we attach to that grade. Does it represent a personal success or a personal failure? It is this perception, rather than the grade itself that guides our emotional life.

This analysis suggests that there are two routes to feeling good about your performance in some domain. You can either raise your level of accomplishment or lower your level of aspiration. According to James, either one will suffice to make you feel better.

Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) recently documented a related tendency. These investigators studied the emotional reactions of medallists at the 1992 Summer Olympics. The critical question of interest was whether silver medallists (who came in second) felt better than did bronze medallists (who came in third). Logically, silver medallists should feel better than bronze medallists, because they performed better. But Medvec et at. hypothesized that silver medallists would actually feel worse than bronze medallists because the silver medallists would be thinking how they might have won the gold medal if only they had made a slight change in strategy or tried a little bit harder.

To test their ideas, Medvec et al. had neutral observers rate the emotional reactions (as revealed in facial expressions) of the two medallists immediately after their athletic competition had ended and later on the medal stand. In accordance with predictions, the data displayed in Figure 2.2 show that, at both time periods, athletes who came in second and won a silver medal exhibited less happiness than did those who came in third and won a bronze medal. These results are of interest because they underscore that emotional reactions to performance outcomes do not simply depend on the objective outcome itself.

In addition to exploring the manner in which people's achievements influence their self-feelings, researchers have extended James's ideas about the nature of negative self-relevant emotions (for a review, see Tangney & Fischer, 1995). One issue that has received attention is the difference between shame and guilt. Some theorists (e.g., Buss, 1980) have suggested that these emotions differ in terms of their public versus private nature. Whereas shame is a public emotion that follows from public disapproval or opprobrium, guilt represents a more private response to the perception that one has failed to live up to one's personal standards and ideals.

FIGURE 2.2. Happiness ratings immediately after an athletic event and on the medal stand among Olympic athletes. The data show that silver medalists (who came in second) were less happy than were bronze medalists (who came in third). These findings underscore that our emotional reactions to outcomes do not depend simply on the objective outcome itself, but also on our ideas about what might have been.

Other theorists (e.g., Barrett, 1995; Lewis, 1971; Lazarus, 1991; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994) have suggested that shame is a more encompassing emotion than is guilt. The focus of guilt is behavior: People feel guilty when they believe they have done something they shouldn't have done. In contrast, shame is a more undifferentiated perception that arises from the perception that one is a bad person or is wholly inadequate. In short, guilt involves a focus on particular misdeeds, whereas shame involves a sense that the entire self is bad (Barrett, 1995).

Finally, shame and guilt differ in terms of their behavioral tendencies (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Guilt gives rise to a tendency to atone for one's (perceived) transgressions and to make reparations. In contrast, shame leads people to want to hide from others, to conceal one's (perceived) deficiencies and shortcomings.

The distinction between shame and guilt highlights that self-feelings are often influenced by our ideas about who we could be, should be, or ought to be. Generally speaking, these hypothetical self-views fall into four categories.

Some of these self-views are realistic. A person may wish to be "a better golfer," "more understanding," or "less competitive." These self-views, which are aspects of what Rosenberg (1979) calls the committed self, and Markus and her colleagues (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989) call the possible self, are attainable. They represent the kind of person one wants to be and can be. This seems to be what James had in mind when he discussed pretensions as level of aspiration. His analysis also suggests that the closer our present self-view comes to these attainable selves, the better we feel about ourselves.

People also entertain more idealized or gloried views of themselves. They dream about being a "famous rock and roll star," "a millionaire," or "a Nobel laureate." Everyone entertains such views of themselves, but most people do not confuse these idealized self-images with the attainable self-image. They recognize that these ideal self-images are largely flights of fancy.

Not everyone makes this distinction, however. Horney (1945) believed that a rigid, idealized self characterizes the neurotic personality. The neurotic, she argued, cannot tolerate feelings of inferiority and so constructs an ideal self-image to hide behind. Such a person has an insatiable need to be the best at everything and to be liked, admired, and approved by everyone. It is impossible, of course, to live up to such rigid expectations, dooming the neurotic to disappointment and frustration.

It is important to note that it is not the possession of idealized self-images, per se, that distinguishes the neurotic from the normal personality. Everyone,

to one extent or another, fantasizes about being something they are not. The problem arises when this idealized self becomes a must self: It is when we must be the "perfect husband," when we must be "a straight-A student," or when we must be the "most popular person in school" that the idealized self-image becomes a source of psychological distress (Blatt, 1985).

Another, related type of belief concerns our ideas about what we should be or ought to be. A child, for example, may believe he has a duty to be "a loyal son who follows in the family business"; a married woman may feel that she has an obligation to be "a productive provider and a nurturant mother." Higgins (1987) has referred to these beliefs as elements of our ought selves, and has provided evidence that people are prone to feelings of guilt and anxiety when their perceptions of who they are now do not coincide with their ideas about who they think they ought to be.

Finally, people also think of themselves in terms of what they are afraid of becoming or do not want to become. One fears being "a failure at business," "an over-the-hill actor," or "dependent on one's children." Ogilvie (1987) refers to these images as aspects of the undesired self and has suggested that they play an important role in how happy and satisfied people are in their

lives. The greater the psychological distance between how we think of ourselves now and what we fear becoming (i.e., the less like these negative selfimages we are), the happier we are in life. These potential negative self-images can also serve an important motivational function. If not too extreme, they can function as incentives. They can force people to work hard in an attempt to avoid these negative identities (Oyserman & Markus, 1990).

Social relationships constitute another important source of self-feelings. Recall that James believed that the material self includes not only our physical characteristics and possessions but also other members of the social world, such as our family, friends, and loved ones. In support of this assertion, people refer to others when describing themselves (e.g., "I am Hillary's husband") (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954; see also, Dollinger & Clancy, 1993), and include a representation of others in their self-concept (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Smith & Henry, 1996).

Being part of the self-concept, other people also evoke self-feelings. This tendency is most apparent with our loved ones (e.g., parents take great pride in the accomplishments of their children), but the effect also extends to less intimate relationships. Consider, for example, the wave of emotion that can overcome fans at a sporting event. After an important victory, it is not uncommon to see fans spilling onto the field chanting, "We're number one." The use of the personal pronoun "we" implies that the victory is experienced in a very personal way and that the feelings of euphoria are of a self-relevant nature (for relevant research, see Cialdini et al., 1986; Hirt, Zillmann, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1995).

The link between social relationships and self-feelings is also thought to have motivational significance. This insight lies at the heart of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social identity theory asserts (1) that social relationships are an important component of the self-concept; (2) that people are motivated to feel good about themselves; and (3) that people feel better about themselves when they believe the groups they belong to are somehow better than the groups to which they do not belong.

Tests of the theory have taken many forms. Research using the minimal intergroup paradigm is of especial interest. In these studies, participants are divided into groups on the basis of relatively meaningless criteria. For example, participants might be shown two paintings and then be divided into groups based on which painting they liked best. Participants are then asked to apportion monetary rewards between the two groups. Reliably, people discriminate in favor of their own group, and doing so makes people feel better about themselves (Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Maass, Ceccarelli, & Rudin, 1996; Oakes & Turner, 1980). This tendency, which is known as ingroup favoritism, supports the claim that even trivial associations with others can have powerful effects on the way people feel about themselves.

Acculturated Integrated Bicultural	Assimilated
Separated Dissociated	Marginalized